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Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit 
Market Conditions, and the Financial Crisis 
Frederick Tung† 
When contemplating Chapter 11, firms often need to seek financing for 
their continuing operations in bankruptcy. Because such financing would 
otherwise be hard to find, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes debtors to offer 
sweeteners to debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders. These inducements can be 
effective in attracting financing, but because they are thought to come at the 
expense of other stakeholders, the Code permits these inducements only if no 
less generous a package would have been sufficient to obtain the loan. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of certain controversial 
inducements—I focus on roll-ups and milestones—has skyrocketed in recent 
years, leading critics to question whether DIP lenders were abusing their 
power. Lenders, however, respond that DIP loan terms simply reflect economic 
conditions: when credit is tight, as it was in recent years because of the 
Financial Crisis, more sweeteners are needed to induce lending. 
Using a hand-collected dataset reflecting contractual detail in DIP loan 
agreements, I examine the relationship between changes in credit availability 
and DIP loan terms before, during, and after the Crisis. As one might expect, I 
find that ordinary loan provisions like pricing and reporting covenants are 
sensitive to changes in credit availability. By contrast, I also find that the 
incidence of so-called “extraordinary provisions” has no statistically 
meaningful relationship with changes in credit availability. These findings have 
important implications for bankruptcy policymakers and judges struggling to 
evaluate whether extraordinary DIP lending inducements are necessary. Too 
generous loan terms come at the expense of junior claimants and may distort 
the bankruptcy process in favor of senior claimants. 
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Introduction 
A firm that seeks refuge in Chapter 11 often requires financing for its 
continuing operations in bankruptcy. Its pre-bankruptcy sources of credit 
typically dry up, and it often cannot proceed without what is known as debtor-
in-possession (“DIP”) financing. The terms of the DIP financing matter a great 
deal for the bankruptcy case and its participants. DIP loans are approved early 
on in the Chapter 11 case, often in a rush. Specific loan terms and the identity 
of the DIP lender have an enormous impact on the ensuing contestation of the 
terms of reorganization, which shape the contours of any surviving business 
and distributions to creditors. 




To induce DIP lending, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the debtor to 
provide prospective lenders with sweeteners that make DIP financing 
attractive. But because these inducements may come at the expense of other 
stakeholders, the Code requires the debtor to convince the court that no less 
generous a package would have been sufficient to obtain the loan. The Code 
expressly authorizes such conventional inducements as first-priority liens and 
payment priority when liens may be insufficient. These inducements make 
sense: lenders to distressed borrowers typically demand strong assurances with 
respect to the new money they bring to the table. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that DIP loans have become 
littered with certain controversial lending inducements in recent years. Some 
have begun to question whether these sweeteners are truly necessary to induce 
lending, suggesting instead that DIP lenders now extract excessively generous 
terms.1 In response, DIP lenders and their defenders note a simple explanation 
for this seeming increase in inducements: reduced credit availability during the 
Financial Crisis.2 When credit is tight, of course lenders need more 
sweeteners—which is why judges have explicitly relied on changing credit 
market conditions to justify their approval of so-called “extraordinary” lending 
inducements.3 
In this Article, I examine whether changes in credit availability explain 
the use of extraordinary inducements in DIP loans. Using a hand-collected 
dataset including detailed information on DIP loan terms from 2004 to 2012, I 
provide the first evidence on the relationship between the presence of these 
terms and changing credit availability. I first show that standard terms, like 
loan pricing and reporting covenants,4 are indeed sensitive to economic 
conditions. I then offer evidence that the extraordinary inducements found in 
DIP loans are generally unrelated to the broader economic conditions that have 
been cited to justify judicial approval. 
 
1. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., 2012-2014 FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 73-79 (2014) [hereinafter ABI REPORT] (discussing findings from a 
study on DIP financing and detailing the Commission’s recommendations, which include limitations on 
creditor inducements for entering into DIP financing agreements). 
2. See, e.g., Robert H. Barnett & Brian J. Grant, Credit Crisis Puts Focus on Out-of-Court 
Restructurings, J. CORP. RENEWAL, June 2010, at 4. 
3. David Griffiths, Roll-Up, Roll-Up, Read All About It!, WEIL BANKR. (Oct. 6, 2010), 
https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/dip-financing/roll-up-roll-up-read-all-about-it 
[https://perma.cc/SP86-34P] (noting bankruptcy judges’ explicit consideration of market conditions 
when granting substantial inducements to DIP financers). 
4. Reporting covenants govern the frequency with which the debtor must report specified 
financial information or events to the lender. A reporting covenant may, for example, require the 
borrower’s monthly reporting of its cash flows. E.g., Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement 77 (Jan. 
20, 2012) in Eastman Kodak, Annual Report Exhibit 4.22 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 29, 2012) (requiring the 
borrower to report cash flows within fifteen days of the end of each fiscal month). 
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I focus on two extraordinary lending inducements that judges and lawyers 
often find troubling: “roll-ups” and case milestones.5 DIP financing is most 
commonly provided by the debtor’s major pre-bankruptcy secured lender. A 
roll-up allows this DIP lender to reduce its financial risk by requiring the 
debtor to draw on the DIP loan to pay off some—typically all—of the DIP 
lender’s pre-bankruptcy secured claim against the debtor. This gives the DIP 
lender a peace of mind rarely enjoyed by other creditors in bankruptcy. 
Creditors’ pre-bankruptcy claims ordinarily get paid only at the end of the case, 
after the debtor—and perhaps competing creditors—have had some 
opportunity to investigate and possibly challenge those claims.6 Absent some 
opportunity to investigate, roll-ups may reduce the debtor’s negotiating 
leverage with the DIP lender going forward.7  Roll-ups also eliminate other 
avenues of negotiation that might otherwise be open to the debtor.8 Case 
milestones are covenants that set specific deadlines for important events in the 
case, giving lenders critical control over the reorganization process and curbing 
the discretion of the debtor’s management and the bankruptcy court. For 
example, a common milestone sets a drop-dead date for the filing or court 
approval of the reorganization plan.9 Milestones are controversial because too 
tight deadlines may advantage senior creditors—like DIP lenders—at the 
expense of junior creditors.10 Neither roll-ups nor case milestones are 
specifically authorized in the Bankruptcy Code. They may even contradict 
specific provisions of the Code.11 
As an empirical matter, because debtor firms are not randomly assigned to 
DIP loans, selection and endogeneity concerns preclude any causal 
conclusions, and my empirical goals are modest. I investigate a cross-section of 
Chapter 11 debtors with DIP loans, examining both ordinary and extraordinary 
provisions in those loans. I search for any evidence suggesting a negative 
association between changes in credit availability and the use of extraordinary 
 
5. See, e.g., ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 76-79 (discussing the Commission’s findings and 
noting concerns regarding roll-ups and case milestones). 
6. Moreover, unsecured creditors’ claims are typically paid with promises of future payment 
that do not make them whole. Outside of the roll-up context, significant pre-bankruptcy claims rarely 
get paid in full in cash in the early part of the case. Also, the new DIP debt, including the roll-up (that is, 
the amount incurred to repay the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim against the debtor) enjoys an 
especially high priority in payment in reorganization. DIP debt must be paid in full in cash as a 
condition to plan confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (2018). 
7. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
8. See id. 
9. A less common milestone sets a deadline for court approval or completion of a specified 
sale of debtor assets. See infra Section II.B. 
10. For example, a quick sale of debtor assets may generate sale proceeds sufficient only to 
pay off a senior creditor, while a longer marketing period might have helped realize a higher sale price. 
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV 1, 26 (2007) 
(concluding a debtor will receive a lower price if the sale is made earlier in the bankruptcy process). 
11. See General Order No. M-274, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York, In re Adoption of Guidelines for Fin. Requests (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter SDNY General Order]. 




provisions. We would expect the use of extraordinary inducements to decrease 
with increasing credit availability (and increase with credit tightening). Indeed, 
we see this result with the “ordinary” provisions that I examine (i.e., pricing 
and loan covenants). However, despite the use of multiple empirical measures 
for changes in credit availability and extraordinary provisions, I fail to find 
evidence of the expected negative association. Moreover, my tests in some 
instances suggest that extraordinary inducements are positively associated with 
changes in credit availability. The causal claims made to justify resort to 
extraordinary provisions do not survive careful scrutiny. Given the absence of 
any association between the use of extraordinary provisions and changes in 
credit availability, extraordinary provisions seem difficult to justify. 
My paper has significant policy implications for bankruptcy participants. 
The market for DIP financing has grown steadily in size and significance in the 
last two decades as the size of public company bankruptcies has increased. 
Individual judges deciding whether to approve a particular set of DIP loan 
terms often face a difficult decision. They must assess whether the 
extraordinary terms are necessary to induce lending, but they do not have the 
benefit of counterfactuals. Judges worry that rejection of the proposed DIP loan 
would spell doom for the debtor: without financing, liquidation may be the 
only alternative. A number of institutional features make the judge’s decision 
doubly difficult. The debtor’s dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender (the 
“inside” lender) enjoys a number of advantages over outside lenders in 
competing to make the DIP loan.12 This inside lender also typically has strong 
incentives to make the DIP loan, which it does in the supermajority of cases.13 
Providing DIP financing enables the senior secured lender to exercise 
significant control over the case.14 With typically only one offer on the table 
and no competitors in sight, judges quite understandably hesitate to reject the 
DIP loan negotiated between the debtor and the inside lender. Instead, the 
judge reluctantly approves the proffered arrangements on the view that the 
terms were necessary to induce critical lending. 
Given the lack of a well-functioning DIP loan market and the dominant 
role for inside lenders in providing DIP financing, it should hardly be 
 
12. See infra Section I.A. (detailing the relationship between the inside lender and the 
borrower in the bankruptcy process). 
13. Inside lenders made 75% of the DIP loans in my sample. See infra Section I.A. 
14. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 512 (2009) (“[C]reditors with senior, secured claims have come to dominate 
the Chapter 11 process.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1236 (2006) (“Senior creditors keep their 
hands on the levers of corporate governance even after the corporation enters Chapter 11.”); David A. 
Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 
1918-19 (2004) (noting the process through which creditors control Chapter 11 cases); Sreedhar T. 
Bharath et al., The Changing Nature of Chapter 11, at 6 (IIM Bangalore, Research Paper No. 461, 
2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443248 [https://perma.cc/NU3X-BQL3] (“Financial innovations (such 
as DIP and KERP), ha[ve] contributed to an increase in creditor control of the Chapter 11 
process . . . .”). 
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surprising that some important DIP loan terms may be less than responsive to 
market pressures, bearing little or no relation to changes in credit availability. 
Recognizing the potentially problematic nature of extraordinary provisions, the 
American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) offered guidelines in recent Chapter 11 
reform proposals to curb or delay the effects of extraordinary DIP loan 
provisions.15 I provide, to my knowledge, the first empirical evidence 
questioning the longstanding and widely held assumption that extraordinary 
provisions are a function of changing credit availability. This analysis will 
hopefully assist policymakers, judges, and other bankruptcy participants to 
better evaluate the DIP lending process in order to optimize DIP loan structure 
going forward. In particular, because roll-ups—and to a lesser extent, 
milestones—run counter to bankruptcy rules and norms, judges should be 
skeptical about their use, which should be rare. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part I offers conceptual and 
institutional background along with a review of the relevant literature. It first 
explains the tricky institutional context within which judges must decide 
whether to approve a given DIP loan. It then discusses the role of loan 
covenants and the effects on loan covenants of changing credit market 
conditions. Part II describes extraordinary provisions, their perceived harms, 
and policy responses. Part III describes the data and empirical results. Part IV 
discusses implications of my findings and then concludes. 
I. Background and Literature Review 
In this Part, I first explain the institutional context in which DIP lending 
occurs, a setting that makes it difficult for judges to police DIP loan terms. I 
follow with a description of the Lyondell DIP loan and the process by which it 
was put together. At the time, it was the second-largest commercial DIP loan in 
history, made in the face of increasingly severe credit scarcity. Finally, as 
prelude to the ensuing analysis of ordinary as well as extraordinary DIP loan 
provisions, I elaborate on the role of loan covenants and the effects on loan 
covenants of changing credit market conditions. 
A. The View from the Bench: Difficulty in Policing DIP Loan Terms 
In a traditional Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor and its multiple 
creditors negotiate over the financial (and sometimes operational) restructuring 
of the firm. The debtor firm, its major secured and unsecured creditors, and an 
official committee representing unsecured creditors typically drive the process. 
The general goal is to reduce the debt burden on the company such that its 
operations can generate sufficient cash flow to service the remaining debt. 
 
15. ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 73-74 (recommending principles to guide DIP financing 
inducements). 




Creditors may agree to reduce their pre-bankruptcy claims against the debtor, 
extend maturities, reduce interest rates, or otherwise ease the debtor’s debt 
burdens. Eventually a plan of reorganization memorializes this multiparty 
bargain. The plan requires both creditor consent and judicial approval.16 The 
bankruptcy court confirms the plan after ensuring all confirmation 
requirements have been met.17 While the debtor typically drafts the plan,18 the 
debtor’s major pre-bankruptcy secured lenders generally enjoy outsized 
influence in reorganization. By the time a firm is facing a Chapter 11 filing, 
substantially all of its assets are typically subject to creditor liens.19 A DIP loan 
enables the debtor’s dominant pre-bankruptcy lenders to augment their control 
of the case.20 
Evaluating whether a DIP loan’s terms are the best available for the 
debtor is no small task for a judge. Institutional features of DIP lending give an 
edge to the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy secured lender in capturing the DIP loan. 
Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, there may be no real competition to 
offer DIP financing. No true market exists for DIP loans. Instead, the debtor’s 
dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender (the “inside” lender) essentially enjoys 
a first option to fund the DIP loan. 
The inside lender typically has enormous incentive to make the DIP loan 
because it has its existing pre-bankruptcy loan to protect. Making this 
“defensive” DIP loan preserves the inside lender’s control over the debtor’s 
assets,21 and it enables the lender to advantage its pre-bankruptcy claim as part 
of the deal.22 It also endows the inside lender with enormous influence over the 
 
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2018) (“The court shall confirm a plan only if . . . each holder of a 
claim or interest of such class—has accepted the plan . . . .”). 
17. See id. 
18. In large public company bankruptcies, the debtor typically enjoys the exclusive right to 
file a plan with the court for the first eighteen months of the case. Id. § 1121(d)(1). This “exclusivity” 
therefore gives the debtor some measure of agenda control. 
19. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
21. The DIP loan would typically be secured by first-priority liens on all the debtor’s assets, 
including its cash, and the lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim would enjoy next priority with respect to the 
debtor’s assets. In this way, the inside lender would control both loans and would enjoy first claim to the 
debtor’s assets to satisfy its debts. 
22. For example, the DIP loan agreement typically requires the debtor to acknowledge the 
validity of the lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim and liens, to recognize its fully secured status, and to waive 
any potential challenges. E.g., Final Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 105, 361, 362, 363 and 364 
and Rules 2002, 4001 and 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (1) Authorizing 
Incurrence by the Debtors of Post-Petition Secured Indebtedness with Priority over Certain Secured 
Indebtedness and with Administrative Superpriority, (2) Granting Liens, (3) Authorizing Use of Cash 
Collateral by the Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 363 and Providing for Adequate Protection, and 
(4) Modifying the Automatic Stay at 7-12, In re Eddie Bauer, Inc., No. 09-12099 (Bankr. D. Del. July 8, 
2009) (detailing the validity of the lender’s prepetition lien). That agreement, of course, would not bind 
the creditors’ committee. 
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debtor and the bankruptcy proceedings.23 Bankruptcy scholars identify DIP 
financing as one important avenue by which secured creditors have gained 
influence over the reorganization process.24 
In addition to this incentive structure, the pre-bankruptcy lender also 
enjoys a significant informational advantage over competing outside lenders 
because of its pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. This up-to-date 
private information may enable the inside lender to underbid prospective 
outside lenders, as well as deter competition ex ante. Prospective outside 
lenders would have to expend resources on due diligence in order to be able to 
offer competitive terms. Once invested, they face the prospect of either getting 
outbid by the inside lender—in which case the outside lender’s investment in 
due diligence is for naught—or potentially overbidding to get the DIP loan. 
Given the inside lender’s information advantage, as well as its incentive to 
make the DIP loan in order to protect its existing pre-bankruptcy loan, outside 
lenders seldom initiate a challenge. 
A pre-bankruptcy lender also typically has pre-bankruptcy liens on all the 
debtor’s assets by the time bankruptcy approaches, so the debtor may have no 
free assets to offer an outside lender as collateral.25 The pre-bankruptcy lender, 
then, may be the only game in town—the only lender willing and able to 
finance the bankruptcy. Consistent with the information and incentive 
structures, inside lenders made 75% of the DIP loans in my sample, and these 
inside lenders enjoy pre-bankruptcy liens on all of the debtor’s assets in 81% of 
the cases. In any case, whether inside or outside lenders make the DIP loan, the 
DIP loan is typically fully secured with first-priority liens on substantially all 
the debtor’s assets. 
 
23. The means of influence include budget constraints and constraints on the debtor’s use of 
its DIP loan proceeds and other cash. See infra Section III.A.3 (detailing the most common covenant 
constraints used by DIP lenders). 
24. See, e.g., Bharath et al., supra note 14. They study deviations from absolute priority—
reorganization plans in which senior creditors waive their right to full payment of their claims in order 
to allow junior claimants to receive some consideration. These deviations reflect incumbent 
management’s hold-up power over creditors and therefore weak creditor influence. The authors 
document a secular decline in the incidence of absolute-priority violations from the 1980s to 2005, as 
well as a corresponding increase in the use of DIP financing. They find a negative association between 
the presence of DIP financing and absolute-priority deviations. See also supra note 14 (listing additional 
relevant sources). 
25. An outside lender would almost certainly insist on first-priority liens to secure its new DIP 
loan, but the court may not authorize such priming liens unless the debtor can offer the pre-bankruptcy 
lender “adequate protection.” 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1)(B) (2018) (stating that a court “may authorize the 
obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt . . . only if . . . there is adequate protection of the” senior 
lender). In order to be able to offer priming liens to the outside DIP lender, the debtor must be able to 
preserve the pre-bankruptcy lender’s secured position—for example, by granting additional liens or 
making cash payments to reduce the pre-bankruptcy lender’s claim—such that the pre-bankruptcy 
lender is not prejudiced by having its liens subordinated to the priming DIP lender’s new liens. The 
debtor in this situation is unlikely to be able to offer adequate protection. Moreover, fights over the 
adequacy of adequate protection in the context of priming liens are contentious and expensive. 




Besides the typically weak competition for any given DIP loan, a rushed 
approval process at the outset of the case makes it difficult for the bankruptcy 
court or junior claimants to challenge the debtor’s generosity in its offering of 
lending inducements. An interim approval of a portion of the proposed DIP 
loan is typically made early in the case (the motion is typically filed on the 
same day as the debtor’s bankruptcy petition).26 The debtor and its lawyers 
claim that the debtor’s cash needs are dire, so that a hearing is held only days 
after the bankruptcy filing, on expedited notice. Given the hectic early days of 
any large Chapter 11 proceeding, approving a DIP loan is only one of dozens 
of issues the bankruptcy court must decide at the outset. So interim DIP loan 
approval is done in a hurry.27 Though the subsequent hearing on the final DIP 
order may be more considered, the interim approval creates a certain 
momentum favoring the status quo.28 The final order might possibly modify 
some terms, but the possibility of an alternative lender is basically foreclosed. 
A final difficulty for judges is the simple fact that obtaining DIP financing 
is good news for the debtor and its creditors. The parties may disagree on the 
details, but they agree that the debtor needs the financing! The finance 
literature by and large finds beneficent case outcomes associated with the 
presence of DIP lending.29 Both stocks and bonds of public companies 
 
26. See 2 JOAN N. FEENEY ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL §§ 11:16, 11:19 (5th ed. 
2019-2). 
27. It is for this reason that important bankruptcy courts and the ABI discourage interim 
approval of extraordinary provisions like roll-ups and milestones. See, e.g., ABI REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 80 (“A court should not approve permissible extraordinary financing provisions in connection with 
any proposed postpetition financing under section 364 in any interim order.”). 
28. The advance of DIP loan proceeds authorized in the interim order is subject only to the 
terms of the earlier order; subsequent modification in the court’s final order does not change the terms 
of the earlier advance. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (2018) (“The reversal or modification on appeal of an 
authorization . . . does not affect the validity of the debt so incurred, or any priority or lien so 
granted . . . .”). This makes some sense, since no lender would advance funds under terms that might 
later be changed. At the same time, however, once funds have been lent, the interim order may tend to 
“anchor” the deal terms in the face of subsequent objections. 
29. This is consistent with findings outside the bankruptcy context that obtaining a bank loan 
is typically good news for a firm. Ronald Best & Hang Zhang, Alternative Information Sources and the 
Information Content of Bank Loans, 48 J. FIN. 1507, 1511 (1993); Matthew T. Billett et al., The Effect of 
Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm’s Equity Return, 50 J. FIN. 699, 700 (1995); Christopher James, 
Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 219 (1987); Scott L. Lummer & 
John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the Capital-Market Response to 
Bank Loan Agreements, J. FIN. ECON. 99, 101 (1989); Myron B. Slovin et al., Firm Size and the 
Information Content of Bank Loan Announcements, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 1057, 1058 (1992). Although 
I hesitate to infer that DIP loans cause these positive outcomes, I note a few possible explanations that 
are not mutually exclusive. First, bank monitoring may add value by improving managerial performance 
during the reorganization, such that emergence becomes more likely. Bankers are repeat players in 
distress situations and may take actions that improve the likelihood of emergence, such as mandating 
that the debtor’s management hire a chief restructuring officer. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 14, 
at 1233 (“[B]anks may condition the waiver of loan covenants on the appointment of a CRO [Chief 
Restructuring Officer].”). Second, prospective DIP lenders may be effective screeners of good credit 
risks, such that the import of DIP lending is in the selection. Both these explanations—monitoring and 
selection—have antecedents in the finance literature on banks generally. See, e.g., Amar Gande & 
Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for Loans?, 67 J. FIN. 
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typically enjoy significant abnormal returns when the company announces a 
DIP loan, suggesting that DIP loans provide widely shared benefits for both 
junior and senior claimants.30 DIP lending is also associated with a higher 
likelihood of the debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy and a shorter time in 
bankruptcy.31 These effects are greater when the DIP lender is also the debtor’s 
pre-bankruptcy lender, suggesting strong screening and monitoring roles for 
relational DIP lenders, who use their private information about debtor firms to 
select for strong borrowers and then help them emerge quickly.32 Researchers 
also find a positive association between DIP loan size and creditor recovery 
rates, consistent with efficient lender monitoring.33 A judge caught between 
approving a DIP order with questionable inducements or denying the debtor’s 
financing might understandably err on the side of caution and approve the loan. 
Institutional factors, then, make it difficult for judges to deny DIP loans, 
even if they may view certain terms as value-reducing. These features of DIP 
financing may create tough hurdles for opponents of aggressive lender 
protections, especially when credit is tight. 
B. The Lyondell DIP Loan 
The Lyondell case offers a useful illustration of the dynamics of DIP loan 
structure during a time of severe credit scarcity. Lyondell Chemical Co., a 
Houston-based chemical company, filed for Chapter 11 on January 6, 2009,34 
during the depths of the Financial Crisis. Aggressive lending inducements for 
Lyondell’s DIP loan included steep pricing, strict covenants, perhaps the 
largest roll-up in history, and draconian milestones. Judge Gerber’s reluctant 
approval of Lyondell’s hotly contested $8.5 billion DIP loan well illustrates 
judges’ predicament. Judge Gerber noted at the time: 
 
1649 (2012). Finally, it is of course possible that the additional funding assists the reorganization 
process, increasing the likelihood of emergence. 
30. See Sris Chaterjee et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3097 
(2004). 
31. Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: 
Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 278 (2003) (“We find that DIP financing is associated with a 
higher probability of emergence as well as a shorter time in bankruptcy (both for firms that reorganize 
and for firms that liquidate.”). 
32. Id. 
33. Chaterjee et al., supra note 30, at 3099; Dahiya et al., supra note 31; Maria Carapeto, Does 
Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value? (Oct. 6, 2003), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.6324&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2EUY-KSVJ]. 
34. This initial filing included all of Lyondell’s U.S. affiliates. Other affiliates followed 
Lyondell into bankruptcy in April and May of 2009. All told, ninety-four Lyondell affiliates ultimately 
filed for bankruptcy. All ninety-four cases were jointly administered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the Southern District of New York. Third Amended Disclosure Statement Accompanying Third 
Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for the LyondellBasell Debtors at 42, In re Lyondell 
Chem. Co., No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Lyondell Disclosure Statement] 
(“All 94 of these Chapter 11 Cases are jointly administered in the Bankruptcy Court.”). 





I assume, or at least hope that economic conditions in this country, including 
freeze-ups of the lending markets and the very limited present availability of 
credit will ultimately improve. What I’m of a mind to recognize and respect now 
in the way of economic reality will be trumped by the facts on the ground with 
respect to economic conditions at the time of the next financing I’m asked to 
approve. And people should be wary of using this case as a precedent in the next 
one that comes down the road, especially if that’s the case after the liquidity 
markets have loosened up.35 
 
About a year earlier, when Lyondell was the third-largest independent publicly 
traded chemical company in North America,36 it had sold itself via a leveraged 
buyout to Basell AF S.C.A., a Dutch subsidiary of an even larger European 
industrial conglomerate. The transaction created the LyondellBasell group of 
companies, one of the world’s largest petrochemical firms, with a post-LBO 
debt burden approaching $30 billion.37 Shortly after this transaction, steeply 
rising oil prices, a global recession, and a rough 2008 hurricane season for the 
Gulf Coast combined to preclude Lyondell from meeting its debt obligations, 
forcing it into bankruptcy.38 
On the day of its bankruptcy filing, Lyondell moved for an order 
authorizing an $8.5 billion DIP loan, at the time, the second-largest commercial 
DIP loan ever.39 With global credit markets extremely tight, Lyondell’s 
proposed DIP loan included a number of important twists to induce lending. 
Most importantly, the requested DIP facility included a $6.5 billion term loan,40 
 
35. Griffiths, supra note 3 (quoting Judge Gerber’s statement in Lyondell). 
36. Lyondell Disclosure Statement, supra note 34, at 25. 
37. Lyondell Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 6. 2009, 5:51 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/lyondellbasell-us-unit-files-for-bankruptcy 
[https://perma.cc/H69M-7DGG]. 
38. Lyondell Disclosure Statement, supra note 34, at 39 (noting volatile commodity prices, the 
global recession, and natural disasters as contributing factors to the company’s bankruptcy filing). 
39. Among other things, the motion asked for an interim order approving an immediate $2 
billion draw to tide the debtors over until a final hearing could be held. Over the following two days, 
hearings were held, and on the second day, the judge approved the interim $2 billion draw. Interim 
Order (I) Authorizing Debtors (A) to Obtain Post-Petition Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 
362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (B) to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 363 and (C) to Purchase Certain Assets Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, (II) Granting Adequate 
Protection to Pre-Petition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 and (III) 
Scheduling Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b) and (c) at 10, Lyondell (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (granting interim financing). The debtors were also given immediate access to a 
$1.5 billion asset-based lending (“ABL”) DIP facility, a revolving facility collateralized by the debtors’ 
inventory and accounts receivable. Id. at 19. 
40. The other $2 billion was in the form of a revolving credit facility. Final Order (I) 
Authorizing Debtors (A) to Obtain Post-Petition Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 
364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (B) to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 363 and (c) to Purchase Certain Assets Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, and (II) Granting 
Adequate Protection to Pre-Petition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 at 
2, Lyondell (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Lyondell Final DIP Order] (noting a $2 billion 
option increase in DIP credit agreement). 
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consisting of $3.25 billion of “new money”—actual new credit for the 
debtors—and a $3.25 billion roll-up. The roll-up debt refinanced $3.25 billion 
of the DIP lenders’ pre-bankruptcy secured debt, essentially doubling the 
interest costs of the term loan.41 The DIP loan also conferred hefty fees to the 
DIP lenders. 
The DIP loan imposed several tight deadlines on the debtor. The DIP 
loan’s original maturity date was set at December 15, 2009, less than a year 
from the date of Lyondell’s bankruptcy filing. And the DIP loan agreement set 
draconian milestones for a case as large and complicated as Lyondell. For 
example, the debtors were given only seven months to deliver a draft plan of 
reorganization and disclosure statement to the DIP lenders.42 
The hearing on the final order approving the DIP loan was hotly 
contested, lasting three days.43 Lyondell’s creditors’ committee objected to the 
tight maturity date and milestones, as well as what it saw as unreasonably tight 
financial covenants. As the Committee also noted, pricing was steep: a 13% 
interest rate and about 7% in fees for what was initially a less-than-one-year 
loan. Under the original maturity, the arrangement would have given the DIP 
lenders a 20% annual return!44 
 
41. Had the $3.25 billion term roll-up not been rolled up, its status as a $3.25 billion pre-
bankruptcy debt would have garnered it interest during the course of the case only to the extent it was 
oversecured, 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2018), and also at a lower rate than the DIP debt. While rolled-up debt 
would generally also enjoy a near-certainty of repayment, since all DIP debt has to be repaid in cash at 
plan confirmation, id. § 1129(a)(9)(A), Lyondell’s DIP loan included an option for the debtors to 
refinance their roll-up debt with a five-year debt security. Lyondell Final DIP Order, supra note 40, at 
63. This was a “dollar-for-dollar” roll-up. Only prepetition secured lenders willing to participate in the 
DIP financing were entitled to roll up their pre-bankruptcy debt, and then only on a dollar-for-dollar 
basis (i.e., one dollar of new DIP financing entitled the DIP lender to roll up one dollar of pre-
bankruptcy debt). Although this aggressive inducement resulted in unequal treatment among prepetition 
secured lenders’ claims, the judge was willing to approve the dollar-for-dollar feature due to Lyondell’s 
dire circumstances. See id. at 20; Griffiths, supra note 3 (noting Judge Gerber’s express consideration of 
economic conditions in granting DIP financing). 
42. The debtors were also given: 
(i) an additional month (until September 15, 2009) to file the plan and disclosure statement 
with the bankruptcy court; 
(ii) a month after that (until October 15, 2009) to obtain bankruptcy court approval of the 
disclosure statement; and 
(iii) a month and a half after that (until December 1, 2009) to have the bankruptcy court hold 
a hearing to confirm the plan. 
Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement Among LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A. et al. 97 (Mar. 3, 
2009). 
43. Griffiths, supra note 3. 
44. Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Motion for an Order 
(I) Authorizing Debtors (A) to Obtain DIP Facility Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 364(c)(1), 
364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (B) to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 
and (c) to Purchase Certain Assets Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to 
Pre-Petition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 and (III) Scheduling a 
Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b) and (c) at 23-24, Lyondell (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
22, 2009) (“The Debtors have committed to borrow money at 20% to pay interest on the Roll Up which 
would otherwise accrue at less than 7%.”). The Committee also objected to the proposed granting of 
liens to the DIP lenders in the debtors’ avoidance actions, id. at 27, as well as the proposed waiver of the 
 




Though Judge Gerber shared many of the Committee’s concerns, he 
approved the $8.5 billion DIP loan nonetheless, recognizing the dramatic 
shrinking of credit markets and that the debtors’ assets would be liquidated if 
no financing were found. As earlier noted, however, he did take pains to try to 
limit the precedential value of his decision.45 
The DIP loan agreement was amended several times over the course of 
the case to extend the loan’s maturity and applicable milestones,46 and 
Lyondell’s plan was ultimately confirmed. Lyondell emerged from bankruptcy 
on April 30, 2010, having spent about sixteen months in Chapter 11.47 
C. Loan Covenants and Credit Markets 
Because lenders know less about prospective borrowers than the 
borrowers know about themselves, lenders need devices to (a) screen for risky 
borrowers before deciding whether to lend and on what terms; and (b) constrain 
borrower risk-taking once a loan is made. Covenants are the most visible 
contractual constraint on borrower risk-taking. This section explains lenders’ 
use of covenants and the effects of credit market changes on loan pricing and 
covenant design. 
1. Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Covenants 
The typical bank loan agreement specifies a number of financial 
covenants—continuing obligations relating to the borrower’s financial 
condition that serve as tripwires should the borrower falter. For example, a 
common financial covenant requires the borrower to maintain a minimum level 
of cash flow.48  Such a requirement benefits banks by assuring them that the 
 
debtors’ rights under § 506(c) to surcharge the collateral, id. at 29. Section 506(c) authorizes the debtor 
to charge a secured creditor’s collateral for reasonable expenses incurred to preserve or dispose of that 
collateral to the extent the secured creditor benefits. The debtor’s waiver of section 506(c) rights forces 
unsecured creditors to bear the costs of preserving the DIP lender’s collateral. The Bankruptcy Court for 
the Southern District of New York lists § 506(c) waivers among its extraordinary provisions. See SDNY 
General Order, supra note 11, at 10 (“Extraordinary Provisions include any waiver of the debtor’s right 
to a surcharge against collateral under section 506(c) . . . .”). 
45. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
46. Lyondell Disclosure Statement, supra note 34, at 47. 
47. The new money DIP loan claims were repaid in full. The DIP roll-up claims were 
refinanced with new notes in the same principal amount as their roll-ups, which the debtors anticipated 
would amount to 100% recoveries. The prepetition secured claims received the lion’s share of the 
common stock in the reorganized Lyondell. General unsecured creditors received a 16.8% recovery in 
the form of cash and common stock, plus the possibility of additional payments based on causes of 
action of the debtor to be pursued by a special Litigation Trust post-reorganization. Id. at 9. 
48. A cash flow covenant may state a minimum dollar requirement over a specified period. Or 
it may take the form of a coverage ratio, which requires the borrower to maintain its cash flow at or 
above a certain multiple of its interest expense. One study of public-company loan agreements finds that 
83% contain some form of cash flow covenant. Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of 
Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 172 (2009). 
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borrower will be able to meet its loan obligations: steady cash flow evidences 
the borrower’s ability to make its regular interest payments. Similarly, the loan 
agreement may require regular reporting of the borrower’s cash levels. A 
lending agreement may also require or prohibit certain activities that could 
affect the riskiness of the loan. For example, a cap on capital expenditures or 
other investments is common,49 as is a requirement that the borrower maintain 
adequate insurance. 
Lenders use covenants to constrain borrower moral hazard once the loan 
is made. Without these constraints, borrowers may be tempted to take on more 
risk after the loan is made than they let on beforehand.50 The borrower’s 
violation of a covenant is considered an event of default. Upon default, the 
lender is entitled to call the loan and seize and sell the debtor’s assets to satisfy 
the debt. Covenants essentially determine control rights over the borrower’s 
assets.51 This risk of loss serves as an important deterrent to excessive risk 
taking. 
Besides constraining borrower risk-taking ex post, covenants also help 
lenders screen their borrowers ex ante.52 A borrower willing to accept strict 
covenants effectively signals its creditworthiness to the lender and its 
willingness to narrow its risk-shifting opportunities. Not surprisingly, tighter 
covenants are associated with lower borrowing costs,53 since tight covenants 
offer the lender more sensitive trip wires and stronger constraints on borrower 
 
49. To deter overly aggressive investments by the borrower, capital-expenditures covenants 
place either a strict dollar limit on annual capital expenditures or set a cap based on the borrower’s 
earnings or revenues. Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN. 
ECON. 400, 405 (2009) (finding that 42% of firms in their 1996-2005 sample period faced a capital 
expenditure covenant). To further deter overly aggressive investment, capital-expenditures covenants 
are often paired with covenants that subject the loan’s proceeds to explicit restrictions. For example, the 
loan contract may mandate loan prepayments to the extent the borrower finds itself with “excess” cash, 
as defined in the contract. Id. Michael Bradley and Michael Roberts note in a sample of bank loan 
agreements to public and private companies that 62.5% contain an asset sale sweep covenant—requiring 
loan prepayment from the proceeds of certain asset sales; 46.2% contain a debt sweep—requiring 
prepayment from proceeds of debt offerings; and 45.9% contain an equity sweep—which requires 
prepayment from proceeds of an equity offering. Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure 
and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants 11 (Mar. 11, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=466240 
[https://perma.cc/3Z98-GD3J]. 
50. A borrower with limited liability may be tempted to take excessive risk in search of higher 
returns, despite the accompanying possibility of larger losses, since its losses are limited to the value of 
its assets. 
51. Collateral plays a similar role. By granting security interests in its property to the lender, 
the borrower essentially offers the lender a semiprivate enforcement remedy should the borrower 
default. This enables the lender to sell the collateral with relatively little oversight by a court or other 
public regulator. Colleen Honigsberg et al., State Contract Law and Debt Contracts, 57 J.L. & ECON. 
1031 (2014). I do not focus on collateral, however, because there is little variation in collateral coverage 
across the sample firms. 
52. See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, The Information Content of Bank Loan 
Covenants, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3700, 3701 (2010); Nicolae Garleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and 
Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 749 (2009). 
53. Demiroglu & James, supra note 52, at 3701. 




risk taking. This better pricing is consistent with the notion that borrowers’ 
accession to stricter constraints signals lower risk to lenders. 
The lender will monitor the borrower to ensure that it adheres to its 
contractual constraints. Covenants encourage monitoring, and they are more 
valuable to lenders who monitor well.54 Contracts provide lenders with 
multiple mechanisms to facilitate such monitoring. First, the borrower will 
generally be required to provide regular reports on its financial condition and 
operating obligations. Second, the borrower will be required to notify the 
lender should specific negative events occur.55 Third, the contract will provide 
the lender with wide access to the borrower’s books and records, properties, 
and management. The loan agreement may even require the borrower to keep 
its deposit accounts with the lender bank. This arrangement facilitates the 
bank’s real-time monitoring of the borrower’s cash flows, giving the bank a 
clear window into the borrower’s financial performance.56 And in the case of 
default, this arrangement enables the bank to enforce its loan against the 
borrower’s cash. 
Covenants are not costless. While they protect lenders, they may also 
impede value-enhancing strategies of the borrower, since lenders’ primary 
concern will be borrowers’ ability to repay, not their value maximization. 
Renegotiation following covenant violations is also common. Though routine, 
renegotiation may be costly. Technical violations do not typically signal 
financial distress. Instead, the lender uses the covenant violation as an 
opportunity to reevaluate the borrower’s operational and financial condition 
and reset the breached covenant.57 In addition, when violations do signal 
financial distress, the exercise of lender remedies may sacrifice going-concern 
value. 
2. Credit Market Conditions 
As one would expect, loan pricing and contracting practices vary with 
market conditions. Because lender-protective features like covenants curb the 
latitude of borrower management, borrowers tend to resist these constraints. 
 
54. Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, 
50 J. FIN. 1113, 1134 (1995) (“Effective use of covenants forces the lender to do some monitoring . . .  . 
.”). 
55. For example, a lender may be required to notify the bank if any of the following occur: 
default or potential default on a material loan provision, the threat or commencement of material 
litigation against the borrower, or receipt of a notice from a government agency of a material regulatory 
violation. 
56. See Fisher Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 
326 (1975) (explaining the informational advantages for a lender from maintaining its borrower’s 
deposit account); Arnoud W. A. Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?,, 9 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 7, 11 (2000); Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 29, 36-38 (1985). 
57. Roberts & Sufi, supra note 48, at 160. 
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When credit is plentiful and lenders must compete to make loans, borrowers 
enjoy more bargaining power to minimize constraints. The opposite is true 
when credit is scarce. Empirical studies confirm that when credit is scarce, not 
only does pricing increase, but loan contracts include more lender-protective 
features.58 Covenants become more numerous and more restrictive as the risk-
free rate of interest increases.59 A similar association exists with respect to 
collateral requirements.60 
Albert Choi and George Triantis offer a nuanced explanation of the 
interaction between price and non-price terms. While lender-friendly changes 
in credit markets move both price and non-price terms in lenders’ favor, Choi 
and Triantis show that bargaining power does not affect price and non-price 
terms independently. Instead, in an environment of information asymmetry, 
price changes not only affect the division of gains from trade; they also affect 
the severity of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which in turn 
affect covenant structure. Price increases exacerbate both moral hazard and 
adverse selection, attracting more high-risk borrowers seeking to pool with 
low-risk borrowers, and more strongly encouraging post-borrowing asset 
substitution. To be effective for screening and signaling and combating moral 
hazard, covenants need to be more stringent as pricing increases.61 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are likely to be much less severe in 
the DIP loan context than in the context of garden-variety commercial loans. 
Because the prototypical DIP lender is the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy secured 
lender, that lender is already familiar with the debtor’s management, 
operations, and financial condition. Having already invested in the debtor, the 
inside lender’s screening activity is quite focused. It evaluates the debtor’s 
prospects for rehabilitation to determine whether to make a follow-on 
investment to improve its total return from its loans to the debtor. Moral hazard 
is also likely to be much less severe in bankruptcy, given the debtor’s required 
public-disclosure obligations in bankruptcy and the careful monitoring by the 
DIP lender, other creditors, and the court. While we expect greater information 
asymmetry with outside DIP lenders, the infinitesimally low default rate for 
DIP loans suggests that even outside DIP lenders do well at picking good risks 
and curbing debtor-in-possession moral hazard.62 
 
58. Bradley & Roberts, supra note 49, at 21 (“[M]acroeconomic factors also play a role in the 
determination of the covenant structure of corporate bonds. The greater the credit spread, the greater the 
number of covenants . . . .”). 
59. Matthew T. Billett et al., Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt 
Maturity, and Covenants, 62 J. FIN. 697, 708 (2007); Nini et al., supra note 49, at 408. 
60. Arnoud W. A. Boot et al., Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, 
Policy Implications and Empirical Results, 101 ECON. J. 458, 471 (1991). 
61. Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in 
Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 70 (2013). 
62. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (highlighting low historical default rates for 
DIP lenders). 




Of course, information will not be perfect even in the DIP context. DIP 
lenders use covenants as tripwires the same way that lenders do outside of 
bankruptcy: DIP loan covenants are occasionally breached and then 
renegotiated just as with non-bankruptcy loans.63 To the extent information 
asymmetry exists in DIP lending, we would expect that the phenomenon Choi 
and Triantis posit for credit market conditions and loan terms outside of 
bankruptcy would hold for DIP loans as well. Price changes should beget 
corresponding changes in covenants and other non-price DIP loan terms, 
though with less information asymmetry in DIP lending, we would expect the 
magnitude of such changes to be less severe than in non-bankruptcy lending 
markets.64 
II. Extraordinary Lending Inducements 
Customary lending inducements available in bankruptcy help to overcome 
the debt overhang that precludes fresh financing outside of bankruptcy. Section 
364 of the Code expressly enumerates and authorizes such conventional 
inducements as payment priority and new liens, which may even enjoy 
seniority over existing pre-bankruptcy liens.65 In addition to these expressly 
authorized inducements, market participants have introduced so-called 
“extraordinary” provisions also meant to induce lending. Although not 
explicitly authorized under the Code, a recent study found, consistent with my 
findings below,66 that the “vast majority” of DIP agreements include these 
types of provisions.67 The provisions are controversial because they may be 
inconsistent with specific Code provisions. In addition, they are often thought 
to increase the DIP lender’s control at the expense of other stakeholders. 
 
63. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing mid-stream covenant 
modifications in the Lyondell case). 
64. In Choi and Triantis’s model, in the absence of information asymmetry, covenants and 
other non-price terms would not change in the face of credit market changes. Instead, only the pricing 
would change. Choi & Triantis, supra note 61, at 66. 
65. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2018). Inducements range from (a) an offer of basic administrative 
priority, which entitles a creditor to be paid ahead of general unsecured claims along with other 
administrative expenses, to (b) a higher priority that places the new debt ahead of all administrative 
expenses, to (c) collateral of various priorities—liens on free assets, junior liens on assets with existing 
liens, or even “priming” liens that are senior to any pre-existing liens. To protect the preexisting security 
interests that are burdened with equal or priming liens, Section 364 requires that the debtor give 
“adequate protection” to those secured creditors. Id. § 364(d)(1)(B). Adequate protection intends to 
preserve the secured creditors’ pre-bankruptcy position with respect to their collateral. For example, if a 
primed secured creditor was fully secured on the petition date but would be undersecured as a result of 
the priming, the debtor could grant the primed secured creditor additional liens to ensure that the 
secured creditor maintained its fully secured position. In any event, the DIP loan is required to be paid 
off in cash as a condition to confirming the plan of reorganization. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A). By contrast, 
other claims may be satisfied with promises of future payment. 
66. See infra Section III.A.3. 
67. LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N, THE TROUBLE WITH UNNEEDED BANKRUPTCY 
REFORM: THE LSTA’S RESPONSE TO THE ABI CHAPTER 11 COMMISSION REPORT 23 (2015) [hereinafter 
LSTA REPORT]. 
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As noted above, Section 364 suggests a general constraint on the use of 
inducements: the debtor may extend only as much inducement as is necessary 
to obtain the desired DIP financing. The debtor must show that no lesser 
inducements would suffice—at least in theory. This approach recognizes that 
inducements are not costless; they can take value away from junior claimants. 
This Part begins by describing roll-ups and milestones, two of the most 
common extraordinary DIP loan provisions, and explaining how DIP lenders 
use these devices to advantage themselves in bankruptcy. I then summarize the 
policy responses by the courts and bankruptcy professionals to the use of these 
extraordinary provisions. 
A. Roll-Ups 
A roll-up is a strong inducement for the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy secured 
lender to fund a DIP loan. The roll-up grants this inside DIP lender an enviable 
position by requiring that the debtor draw on the DIP loan to pay off some—
most typically all—of the inside lender’s pre-bankruptcy secured claim,68 
typically early on in the case. This essentially refinances the pre-bankruptcy 
debt with DIP debt, which offers the DIP lender a number of potential 
advantages—with respect to both the treatment of its pre-bankruptcy claim and 
its influence over the case—that other creditors do not enjoy. 
1. Cross-Collateralization’s Ghost 
Roll-ups are the progeny of an earlier, somewhat controversial DIP 
financing practice called cross-collateralization. In its common form, the 
debtor’s major secured pre-bankruptcy lender would be undersecured, but 
would be willing to extend the DIP loan as long as the debtor granted 
postpetition liens to secure not only the DIP loan but also the unsecured portion 
of the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy debt.69 This maneuver is objectionable 
because the amount and nature of creditor claims are generally determined as 
of the date of the bankruptcy petition. A claim’s unsecured status as of the 
petition date renders that claim unsecured for the entire case; the Code offers 
no possibility for an upgrade later on in the case. Collateralizing an unsecured 
pre-bankruptcy claim after the bankruptcy filing therefore upsets the 
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Secured creditors should be paid before 
unsecured creditors, but cross-collateralization gives a priority jump to the DIP 
 
68. Seventy-eight percent of the roll-ups in the sample roll up all of the DIP lender’s pre-
bankruptcy claim. These 100% roll-ups comprise 41% of the DIP loans in the sample. Three quarters of 
the roll-ups involve defensive DIP loans. 
69. See, e.g., Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092 
(2d Cir. 1979). 




lender’s unsecured pre-bankruptcy claim,70 which would otherwise be paid 
only a fraction of its face amount at the end of the case. 
The practice of cross-collateralization began in the 1970s, in the waning 
years of the former Bankruptcy Act.71 As with roll-ups today, the justification 
offered was that the prospective DIP lender would not lend otherwise.72 Courts 
approving the practice however, did recognize cross-collateralization as a 
“disfavored means of financing,”73 to be used only as a last resort. The practice 
more or less ended with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re Saybrook 
Manufacturing Co. in 1992,74 the first Court of Appeals decision to state 
definitively that cross-collateralization is not an authorized method of 
postpetition financing. Cross-collateralization is “directly contrary to the 
fundamental priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.”75 
2. Roll-Up’s Refinement 
Cross-collateralization seems quaint in the context of roll-ups, a clever 
refinement offering treatment even better than the earlier practice. In a given 
case, roll-up improves the DIP lender’s return on its DIP loan and may 
augment the DIP lender’s control over the bankruptcy case. Roll-ups also raise 
the systemic concerns described below. 
To the extent the pre-bankruptcy debt was undersecured at the time of the 
bankruptcy filing, the benefit of a roll-up is clear. While the secured portion of 
the debt would typically get paid in full at the end of the case, unsecured pre-
bankruptcy debt typically gets paid only a fraction of its face amount, and 
again, only at the end of the case.76 By contrast, a roll-up pays in full both the 
secured and unsecured portions of the DIP lender’s undersecured pre-
bankruptcy debt in the early part of the case—better treatment than even pre-
bankruptcy secured claims enjoy, and clearly inconsistent with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority scheme.77 Cashing out the unsecured pre-bankruptcy debt at 
 
70. See Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking 
Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1250-51 (2013) (describing the priority jump for 
undersecured DIP lenders). 
71. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 62-57, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). The 
Second Circuit criticized cross-collateralization in the Texlon decision in 1979. However, the court 
made no categorical pronouncement against its use. Texlon, 596 F.2d 1092. 
72. In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); see In re 
Beker Indus., 58 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Tom McCormick Enters., 26 B.R. 437, 439-40 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983). 
73. Vanguard Diversified, 31 B.R. at 366. 
74. 963 F.3d 1490 (1992). 
75. Id. at 1495. 
76. Undersecured claims are generally bifurcated into the secured portion—which depends on 
the value of the collateral securing the claim—and the unsecured portion. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) 
(2018). 
77. See Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner Marine, 
Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While § 364 authorizes the grant of priority or a security 
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full face value is the ultimate priority jump, and it of course eliminates any 
reorganization risk for that paid-in-full debt.78 Even if the reorganization were 
ultimately to fail, that would not affect the earlier payoff of unsecured pre-
bankruptcy debt. 
In addition, whether fully or undersecured, pre-bankruptcy debt can 
benefit from a roll-up by improving the DIP lender’s control over the case. 
Cashing out that pre-bankruptcy debt eliminates potential challenges to the 
validity of that debt or its secured status,79 which reduces the debtor’s and 
competing creditors’ bargaining power with the DIP lender. Moreover, roll-up 
may change the dynamics of plan negotiation by eliminating not only 
reorganization risk but also the risk of “cramdown” of the DIP lender’s 
prepetition claim. Cramdown allows the debtor to confirm a plan over a 
secured lender’s objection by essentially continuing the pre-bankruptcy secured 
loan at a rate of interest reflecting the risk of the loan.80 But once the DIP 
lender’s pre-bankruptcy loan is rolled up, the cramdown option disappears. 
Without the threat of cramdown, the debtor has less leverage against the DIP 
lender in negotiating the plan of reorganization. To be sure, DIP lenders may 
have other devices in their arsenal besides the roll-up to enhance their influence 
over the case.81 But negotiations occur at the margin, so marginal 
enhancements matter for all the parties. 
By using the DIP loan to cash out the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim, 
not only does that claim get paid early and in full, but the roll-up effectively 
transforms the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim into a fully secured,82 first-
 
interest in estate assets in order to provide some assurance to post-petition lenders, the assurances so 
authorized do not include payment of pre-petition unsecured debt with estate assets. There is no other 
applicable provision in the Bankruptcy Code authorizing the debtor to pay certain pre-petition unsecured 
claims in full while others remain unpaid. To do so would impermissibly violate the priority scheme of 
the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
78. This is true for roll-ups of fully secured debt as well. 
79. Roe & Tung, supra note 70, at 1251-52 (“[I]n a roll-up, the bankruptcy process often does 
not examine the old collateral’s adequacy and the older loan’s bona fides carefully.”); George Triantis, 
Debtor-in-Possession Financing in Bankruptcy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCY LAW (Barry Adler ed., forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977686.2019). 
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
81. For example, senior secured lenders are frequent sponsors of restructuring support 
agreements. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593, 603 (2017) 
(detailing senior lenders’ use of restructuring support agreements to gain control over reorganization 
process). Senior lenders also commonly “advise” debtors regarding the appointment of a chief 
restructuring officer. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 14. Moreover, it is not uncommon for a DIP 
loan agreement to prohibit the debtor from filing a plan not approved by the DIP lender. See, e.g., 
$75,000,000 Debtor-in-Possession Credit, Security & Guaranty Agreement Among TerreStar Networks 
Inc., et al. 2 (Oct. 2010) (defining an “Acceptable Plan” as a plan “in form and substance reasonably 
acceptable to the Required Lenders”); id. at 14 (including as a “Milestone Requirement” the filing of an 
Acceptable Plan by November 5, 2010). 
82. The DIP loan will typically be fully secured, with back-up administrative priority in case 
the security later turns out to be insufficient. See Daniel J. Bussell & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating 
Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 707 n.209 (2009) (“‘Roll-ups’ are arrangements 
whereby prepetition secured claims are converted to postpetition secured claims.”); Roe & Tung, supra 
note 70, at 1251 (noting that roll-up of pre-bankruptcy loans “effectively convert[s] the DIP lender’s 
 




priority, high-interest-bearing post-bankruptcy claim. The rolled up debt—now 
part of the DIP loan—earns interest at a healthy rate during the course of the 
case, along with the new money DIP debt.83 By contrast, in the absence of a 
roll-up, the pre-bankruptcy debt would accrue interest only if and to the extent 
it was oversecured,84 and generally at a lower rate than the DIP debt. As part of 
the DIP loan, the rolled up debt will also get cashed out at the end of the case.85 
Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates. This full cash payment of the DIP 
lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim does not come for free, of course. It gets paid by 
junior claimants, since fewer assets are available to pay off juniors at the back 
of the line for distribution. 
In addition to issues of DIP lender control and roll-up costs that may 
affect a particular case, roll-ups also create an important systemic problem: 
they obfuscate DIP loan costs and pricing. For a DIP loan without a roll-up, of 
course, calculating all-in spread is straightforward. And even for a roll-up DIP 
loan, one could calculate a no-roll-up-equivalent all-in spread. Just back out the 
roll-up amount and solve for the new interest rate (including fees) based only 
on the DIP loan’s new money. Easy enough in theory. But as a systemic matter, 
when the parties are negotiating terms and looking for comparable cases, 
comparisons become difficult when there are too many factors to consider. It 
becomes especially difficult from the debtor’s side. The lender is the repeat 
player; the debtor is a one-off (typically). Add to that the possibly short fuse for 
putting together the DIP loan in the run-up to the Chapter 11 filing, and the 
debtor may be overmatched. 
Roll-ups are controversial because they are not authorized in the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 364 on DIP financing makes no mention of paying 
off pre-bankruptcy debt. Indeed, roll-ups contravene the general notion that 
pre-bankruptcy claims must wait until the conclusion of the case for payment, 
pursuant to a distribution scheme memorialized in a confirmed plan of 
reorganization. 
 
(likely) undersecured pre-bankruptcy loan into a full secured postpetition claim”); James J. White, 
Death and Resurrection of Secured Debt, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. 139, 182 (2004) (explaining that roll-
ups allow DIP lenders to convert prepetition secured debt into postpetition secured debt, and that this 
process “has become frequent if not commonplace”). 
83. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text (noting somewhat surprisingly high rates 
of interest for DIP loans). 
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2018). 
85. The debtor is required to pay off the entire DIP loan in full in cash as a condition to the 
confirmation of any reorganization plan. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A). During the depths of the Crisis, some 
confirmed plans offered flexibility on this score, allowing the debtor to pay off the DIP loan with 
securities of the reorganized debtor instead of cash. See supra note 47 (discussing the Lyondell DIP loan 
repayment). 
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DIP lenders use milestones to impose important time constraints on the 
debtor’s conduct of the bankruptcy case. These provisions place specific 
deadlines on the debtor, typically with respect to the filing or court approval of 
its plan of reorganization or disclosure statement. When a major asset sale is in 
the offing, the DIP lender often sets milestones with respect to the sale process 
as well. Milestones may affect case outcomes because they tend to shorten the 
time that the debtor would otherwise have to accomplish particular tasks—
tasks for which the Bankruptcy Code already specifies a timeline and 
discretionary judicial management. For example, in the court’s discretion, the 
debtor may enjoy the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization for up to 
eighteen months.86 The purpose of this exclusivity provision is to fix the debtor 
as the focal party in managing restructuring negotiations and drafting the plan. 
A lender-mandated timetable constrains the court’s discretion and diminishes 
the debtor’s central role, potentially causing lost value for other claimants 
besides the DIP lender. 
At the same time, however, milestones may play a useful role in setting 
expectations and expediting the reorganization process. In some cases, senior 
lenders’ timetable may align with the interests of other stakeholders in getting a 
deal done.87 For this reason, milestones may generally be less controversial 
than roll-ups. 
C. Policy Responses to Extraordinary Provisions 
As early as 2002, courts began to express concerns about extraordinary 
provisions. Multiple sources have recommended restricting their use. At the 
same time, the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), a trade 
association for syndicated lenders, vigorously defends the use of extraordinary 
provisions. 
In 2002, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
issued guidelines: extraordinary provisions (a) require conspicuous disclosure 
in DIP motions; and (b) will generally not be approved in an interim order 
absent “substantial cause shown, compelling circumstances and reasonable 
notice.”88 Extraordinary provisions include roll-ups and any provisions “that 
 
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(a) (2018). The Code sets an initial exclusivity period of 120 days. 
Id. at § 1121(b). The judge may shorten or lengthen exclusivity for cause. Id. at § 1121(d)(1). A judge 
will typically extend exclusivity at the debtor’s request as long as she is convinced that the debtor and 
major creditors are making progress toward a negotiated resolution of the case. In the large public-
company reorganization cases, the debtor typically enjoys exclusivity for the duration of the case (up to 
the 18-month limit). 
87. See Baird, supra note 81, at 607 (“When senior creditors . . . put the plan on a tight 
timetable . . . , their pursuit of their own self-interest may work to everyone’s advantage.”). 
88. SDNY General Order, supra note 11, at 2. The General Order also applies to cash 
collateral motions under § 363 of the Code. Id. at 3-4. In particular, the court decreed that (i) a motion 
 




divest the Court of its power or discretion in a material way”89 (e.g., 
milestones). Delaware’s Bankruptcy Court, the most popular venue for public-
company Chapter 11s, adopted a similar local rule.90 
As for roll-ups specifically, the Southern District of New York guidelines 
direct the court to consider, among other things, the amount of new credit to be 
offered and whether the advantages of the proposed financing justify the costs 
of cashing out the pre-bankruptcy secured debt, as opposed to satisfying that 
debt with new promises of future payment.91 In other words, the court should 
weigh the costs of refinancing the pre-bankruptcy debt with high-priority high-
interest postpetition financing—which itself must be cashed out at plan 
confirmation—against the benefits from the new credit. The ABI also 
considered the proliferation of extraordinary provisions in DIP loans in its 
comprehensive 2014 report reviewing Chapter 11 practices.92 Skeptical that 
these provisions are necessary to induce DIP financing, the Commission 
proposed significant restrictions echoing the approach of the New York and 
Delaware bankruptcy courts.93 
The ABI report prompted a response from the LSTA: the ABI’s approach 
to reform, “while well-intentioned and informed by much hard work and 
debate, is misguided.”94 For extraordinary provisions specifically, the LSTA 
noted the lack of reliable empirical evidence to support the ABI’s reforms. 
Moreover, the LSTA cautioned that the ABI’s proposed restrictions could have 
unintended consequences, such as reduced loan volumes. Banning or limiting 
roll-ups and milestones could also cause lenders to demand other forms of 
compensation, such as higher interest rates. The LSTA also argued that 
milestones may improve efficiency by shortening the debtor’s time in 
bankruptcy when assets are deteriorating.95 
 
for DIP financing must “disclose prominently” whether the financing includes any of the enumerated 
extraordinary provisions; (ii) such provisions must be “disclosed conspicuously” in the motion and any 
accompanying order, and (iii) the justification for an extraordinary provision must be separately set 
forth. Id. at 4, 6. 
89. Id. at 9. 
90. Bankr. D. Del. R. 4001-2. 
91. The guidelines highlight “the loss to the estate of the opportunity to satisfy the prepetition 
secured debt otherwise in accordance with applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” SDNY 
General Order, supra note 11, at 8. The Code specifically allows the debtor to pay the present value of 
the pre-bankruptcy secured claim with promises of future payment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
(2018). 
92. See ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 73. 
93. The Commission recommended that several extraordinary provisions, including roll-ups 
and milestones, not be permitted in interim orders. Id. at 80. The Commission recommended final 
approval of a roll-up only if the new money from the DIP loan comfortably exceeds the size of the roll-
up, and the DIP loan at issue is the best available option and is in the best interests of the estate. As for 
milestones, the Commission recommended final approval only for milestones that provide the debtor 
with at least sixty days to complete the task in question. Id. at 73. 
94. LSTA REPORT, supra note 67, at 9. 
95. Id. at 56. 
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Given the evidence of the positive effects of DIP loans generally,96 it may 
be that roll-ups and milestones are worth the potential costs if indeed, credit 
market conditions affect their use. Courts typically justify these inducements 
with the recitation that no other financing is in sight, and the extraordinary 
terms are necessary to close the deal.97 If credit markets are tight, then any 
potential negative side-effects may be insignificant compared to the benefits of 
the DIP loan. On the other hand, in the absence of a demonstrable association 
between the use of extraordinary provisions and changes in credit availability, 
extraordinary provisions seem hard to justify. 
III.  Empirical Analysis 
In this Part, I discuss my empirical findings on the variation in DIP 
lending arrangements before, during, and after the Financial Crisis. After 
describing the sample and data sources, I explain how each of the four loan 
provisions—loan pricing, covenants, roll-ups, and milestones—changed during 
the Crisis. As noted above, I expect loan contracting practices to vary with 
market conditions. 
A. Data and Sample 
1. Sample Selection 
The sample of cases comes from Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research 
Database (BRD), which captures all “large” public company bankruptcy filings 
since October 1, 1979. A large case for BRD involves at least $100 million in 
assets measured in 1980 dollars (about $280 million in current dollars). I 
restrict the sample to BRD cases filed in 2004-2012 that involve non-financial 
firms and were resolved as of February 7, 2013, giving us 278 cases. Of these, 
DIP loans are present in 172 cases (62% of all cases). 
I also rely on BRD for many firm, case, and loan characteristics: DIP loan 
amounts, case outcomes (i.e., traditional reorganization, prepackaged 
bankruptcy, § 363 sale, or other), financial characteristics, and whether the 
 
96. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
97. For example, the Delaware bankruptcy court permits roll-ups, but only where they are 
conspicuously identified in the motion to approve financing and are justified. Bankr. D. Del. R. 4001-
2(a)(i) (requiring that financing motion: (a) note whether extraordinary provisions are included, (b) 
identify such extraordinary provisions, and (c) justify such provisions). New York requires a hearing to 
approve a roll-up. Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R. 4001-2(e) (requiring notice to those directly affected and hearing 
on the motion). In sum, courts permit roll-ups, but are skeptical. See, e.g., Transamerica Commercial 
Fin. Co. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he 
use of financing to pay a prepetition unsecured debt is to be used only in extreme cases.”); In re 
EqualNet Commc’ns Corp., 258 B.R. 368, 370-71 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000) (denying DIP financing that 
utilized a roll-up, but permitting certain prepetition claims to be paid during an automatic stay). 




debtor emerged from bankruptcy. For DIP loan agreements, DIP financing 
orders, disclosure statements, and related bankruptcy documents, I rely on 
PACER. I hand-collected data on roll-ups, DIP lenders’ pre-bankruptcy claims, 
case milestones, financial reporting obligations, covenants, and the other deal 
terms described below. Finally, I obtain loan pricing from the Thomson 
Reuters’ Dealscan database. 
2. Credit Availability 
As the primary measure of credit availability, I use the quarterly 
percentage change in total credit for non-financial corporations (“Available 
Credit”).98 I also use additional measures of changes in credit availability in 
unreported robustness tests.99 Results are generally consistent across all 
measures. As shown in Figure 1 below, my measure of Available Credit 
appears largely consistent with the conventional wisdom about the timing of 
the Crisis.100 Available Credit rose steadily from 2004 through mid-2007, when 
it peaked. A sharper decline followed, bottoming out in late 2009, after which it 
rose gradually through 2012. 
 
 
98. Our credit data come from the Bank for International Settlements. For a discussion of the 
variable, see Long Series on Total Credit and Domestic Bank Credit to the Private Non-Financial 
Sector, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Feb. 25, 2019), 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit/credpriv_doc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CQE-FZAM]. 
99. In addition to quarterly change in total credit for non-financial corporations, I use (1) 
quarterly percentage change in credit availability for the non-financial sector; (2) year-over-year 
quarterly percentage change for the entire U.S., including households and governments; and (3) 
quarterly percentage change in the Credit Suisse High-Yield Bond Fund (CHY). I focus on the change 
in credit availability for non-financial corporations because it is the most relevant to our setting, but the 
results are generally consistent across the various proxies. 
100. The National Bureau of Economic Research determined that the Great Recession in the 
United States began toward the end of 2007 and ended in June 2009. US Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., https://www.nber.org/cycles.html [https://perma.cc/BS8S-
9RFT]. 
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This figure shows the quarterly percentage change in total credit for non-financial 
corporations (“Available Credit”) for the sample period 2004-12. The data come from the 
Bank for International Settlements. The data include all credit to U.S. private and public 
non-financial corporations and reflect credit “provided by domestic banks, all other sectors 
of the economy and nonresidents.” 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 278 Chapter 11 cases in the sample, a disproportionate number 
were filed, not surprisingly, in 2009, during the depths of the Great Recession. 
As Figure 2 below shows, ninety cases—over 30% of the sample—were filed 
in 2009 (left axis). And while 62% of the cases overall had DIP loans, the 
2009-10 period had the lowest percentage of DIP loans (51% and 44%, 
respectively, on the right axis), consistent with the credit scarcity implied by 
the trough we observe in Available Credit in Figure 1. 
 





The vertical bars in this figure show the number of Chapter 11 cases in each sample year 
(left axis). The dotted line captures the percentage of cases with a DIP loan for each sample 
year (right axis). 
 
Figure 3 below summarizes the most common DIP loan features in our 
sample. Of the 172 DIP loans, 155 contain a covenant requiring regular budget 
reconciliations; 151 contain a covenant requiring regular reporting of cash; 99 
contain roll-ups; 55 contain a reorganization-related milestone (typically a 
deadline relating to the filing or court approval of the disclosure statement or 
plan of reorganization); and 26 contain an asset sale-related milestone.101 Table 
1 below contains variable definitions. 
 
 
101. My data are consistent with findings in the finance literature that the presence of a DIP 
loan is associated with a higher likelihood of emerging from Chapter 11. Sixty-four percent of all cases 
in the sample emerged from bankruptcy. Of emerging cases, 77% of debtors with DIP loans emerged, 
while only 43% of debtors without DIP financing emerged. Bankruptcy Research Database codes a 
successful emergence as long as at least one operating company continues to exist post-bankruptcy. 
LYNN M. LOPUCKI, PROTOCOLS FOR THE UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH DATABASE 21-22 
(2016), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/documentation/Protocols.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBA8-M9X6] (“To 
emerge, the firm must continue to exist. . . . A company does not emerge if the company continues to 
operate only for the purpose of liquidation.”). These figures are comparable to a study by the LSTA, 
which found a 69% reorganization rate among firms with DIP financing and a 52% rate among firms 
without. See supra Section II.C. 
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The vertical bars in this figure quantify the most common DIP loan features in the sample of 
278 Chapter 11 cases. 
 




Table 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable name Definition 
  
Independent Variable of Interest 
 
Available Credit (%) Quarterly percentage change in total credit for 
non-financial corporations 
 
Dependent Variables: Ordinary DIP Loan Provisions 
  
All-in Spread (AIS) All-in spread above LIBOR 
Budget Reporting Reporting interval for budget compliance (in 
days) 
Cash Reporting Reporting interval for cash (in days) 
Financial Covenants Total number of financial covenants 
DIP Loan Dollar amount of DIP Loan 
  
Dependent Variables: Extraordinary DIP Loan Provisions 
  
Roll-up Dummy Indicator for whether a DIP loan includes a 
roll-up feature 
Roll-up Amount of roll-up 
Roll-up/ DIP Loan Roll-up amount scaled by the dollar amount of 
the DIP Loan 
Term Roll-up Dummy Indicator for whether a DIP loan includes a 
term roll-up feature 
Term Roll-up Amount of term roll-up 
Term Roll-up/Lean DIP Amount of term roll-up/(DIP Loan – any 
working capital roll-up amount) 
Disclosure Statement 
Milestone 
Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement 
includes a disclosure statement milestone 
Plan Milestone Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement 
includes a milestone with respect to plan filing 
or plan confirmation  
Sale Milestone Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement 
includes a milestone with respect to a going 
concern sale 
Any Milestone Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement 
includes one or more of the three types of 
milestones 
Firm and Case Characteristics 
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Variable name Definition 
  
  
Assets Total assets before Chapter 11 filing 
Ln (Assets) Log of total assets before Chapter 11 filing 
Liabilities Total liabilities before Chapter 11 filing 
Leverage (Total liabilities / total assets) before Chapter 
11 filing 
Prepack Indicator that case is a prepackaged Chapter 11 
363 Sale Indicator that substantially all the debtor’s 
assets will be sold as a going concern  
  
Indicia of Creditor Control 
 
Same Lender Indicator that DIP lender is also debtor’s 
dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender 
All Pre-Assets Indicator that Debtor’s dominant pre-
bankruptcy secured lender has liens on all 
substantially all debtor assets as of the petition 
date 
All Post-Assets Indicator that DIP loan is secured by 
substantially all DIP assets 
Prime Dummy Indicator that DIP lender enjoys a priming lien 
Budget Reporting Reporting interval for budget compliance (in 
days) 
Cash Reporting Reporting interval for cash (in days) 
 




Table 2 below shows summary statistics, describing in careful detail the 
contours of DIP financing terms that affect the incidence and size of roll-ups, 
as well as the use of case milestones. Of our 172 DIP loans, 58% have roll-ups, 
with a mean (median) value of $201 million ($80 million). To offer some sense 
of the control that DIP lenders enjoy: 74% are defensive DIP lenders, having 
enjoyed the position of the debtor’s dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender 
immediately before the Chapter 11 filing. In addition, 79% of DIP lenders enter 
bankruptcy with liens on substantially all the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy assets, 
while 96% of DIP lenders enjoy liens on substantially all the debtor’s pre- and 
postpetition assets; and 82% of DIP lenders enjoy priming liens in bankruptcy. 
Finally, for DIP loans with roll-ups, the mean (median) ratio of Roll-up to DIP 
loan is 59% (60%). 
I separately describe term roll-ups as well. As more fully explained 
below,102 some bankruptcy lawyers and judges view roll-ups of pre-bankruptcy 
working capital loans as less objectionable than roll-ups of term loans. To 
address this issue, I separately test for the incidence and size of term roll-ups 
and roll-ups generally. As Table 2 shows, 23% of our DIP loans include a term 
roll-up, with mean (median) value of $208 million ($67.5 million). Turning to 
milestones, 47% of DIP loans include at least one milestone. They break down 
as follows: 23% include a disclosure statement milestone; 32% include a plan 
milestone; and 16% include a sale milestone. As for case and firm 
characteristics, 35% of our DIP loan cases are prepackaged bankruptcies, while 
26% involve a going concern sale of substantially all the debtor’s assets. Our 
mean (median) DIP loan firm has assets of $2.8 billion ($637 million) and 
mean (median) liabilities of $2.8 billion ($653 million). 
 
 
102. See infra Section III.C.1. 
07. TUNG ARTICLE. DRAFT 3 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2020  6:23 AM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:651, 2020 
682 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for our 172 Chapter 11 cases that include DIP loans. I 
rely on Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Data for many firm, case, and loan 
characteristics. I hand-collected roll-up and milestone data and financial reporting and other 
covenant data directly from DIP loan agreements, DIP financing orders, disclosure 
statements, and related bankruptcy documents drawn from PACER. For loan pricing, I rely 
on Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan database. 
 
Variable mean std min p25 median p75 max N 
         
Indep Var of 
Interest         
Available Credit (%) 0.73 1.43 -2.00 0 1 2 4 172 
         
Ordinary Loan 
Provisions         
All-in-Spread 530.68 260.84 150 350 450 700 1300 96 
Budget Reporting 26.86 44.93 7 7 14 30 360 155 
Cash Reporting 21.40 33.18 1 7 7 30 360 151 
Financial Covenants 1.66 1.35 0 0 2 3 5 172 
DIP Loan 264.37 727.76 0.70 38.75 85 205 8500 172 
         
Extraordinary 
Provisions         
Roll-up Dummy 0.58 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 172 
Roll-up 111.60 407.33 0 0 18.75 91.70 4900 166 
Roll-up > 0 201.37 531.57 4 37.8 79.75 188.5 4900 92 
Roll-up/ DIP Loan 1.09 1.51 0 0 0.50 1.70 7.33 166 
Roll-up/ DIP Loan > 
0 0.59 0.18 0.05 0.47 0.60 0.73 0.99 92 
Term Roll-up 
Dummy 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 171 
Term Roll-up 47.46 269.43 0 0 0 0 3250 171 
Term Roll-up  > 0 208.11 538.93 3 20.5 67.5 143.7 3250 39 
Term Roll-up/Lean 
DIP 0.19 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 1.00 105 
Term Roll-up/Lean 
DIP > 0 0.52 0.19 0.11 0.41 0.53 0.63 1 39 
Discl Stmt 
Milestone 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 159 




Variable mean std min p25 median p75 max N 
         
Plan Milestone 0.32 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 159 
Sale Milestone 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 159 
Any Milestone 0.47 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 159 
         
Firm and Case 
Char         
Assets 2813.98 7767.75 212 396 636.50 1800 80449 172 
Ln(Assets) 6.86 1.20 5.36 5.98 6.46 7.50 11.30 172 
Liabilities 2803.27 7314.43 137 414.50 652.50 1800 72280 172 
Leverage 1.06 0.59 0.25 0.82 0.96 1.18 6.15 172 
Prepack 0.35 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 172 
Sale 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 172 
         
Indicia of Creditor 
Control         
Same Lender 0.74 0.44 0 0 1 1 1 167 
All Pre-Assets 0.79 0.41 0 1 1 1 1 155 
All Post-Assets 0.96 0.20 0 1 1 1 1 169 
Prime Dummy 0.82 0.39 0 1 1 1 1 172 
Budget Reporting 26.86 44.93 7 7 14 30 360 155 
Cash Reporting 21.40 33.18 1 7 7 30 360 151 
 
Table 3 below offers separate summary statistics for the DIP loan cases 
with and without roll-ups. The two right-hand columns show p-values for (a) t-
tests for differences in means and (b) rank-sum tests for differences in medians. 
With respect to ordinary loan provisions, pricing and covenants show no 
significant differences, except for mean and median size of the DIP loan. The 
mean (median) DIP loan amount for roll-up loans is $339 million ($125 
million), while for DIP loans without roll-ups, the mean (median) amount is 
$163 million ($50 million). It makes sense that DIP loans with roll-ups would 
generally be larger than those without. The amount of new money required for 
the debtor to be able to operate in Chapter 11 would not depend on whether the 
DIP loan includes a roll-up. The roll-up amount is simply added on top of the 
new money. With respect to milestones, the sale milestone is significantly more 
likely with roll-up DIP loans. As for firm characteristics, firms with DIP loans 
without roll-ups show larger median assets and liabilities than firms with roll-
up DIP loans. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for DIP Loan Firms With/Without Roll-ups 
 
This table presents comparisons of loan, firm, and case characteristics as between cases with 
and without roll-ups. The two right-hand columns show p-values for (a) t-tests for 
differences in means and (b) rank-sum tests for differences in medians. 
 
 DIP loan with roll-up DIP loan without rollup  
p-value for 
differences 





          
Indep Var of Interest          
Available Credit (%) 0.85 1 99 0.58 0 73 172 0.218 0.200 
          
Ordinary Loan Provisions          
All-in-Spread 504.23 425 65 586.13 550 31 96 0.151 0.182 
Budget Reporting 29.55 14 92 22.92 15 63 155 0.368 0.837 
Cash Reporting 19.15 14 91 24.81 7 60 151 0.307 0.266 
Financial Covenants 1.79 2 99 1.48 2 73 172 0.139 0.155 
DIP Loan 339.41 125 99 162.59 50 73 172 0.079* 0.000*** 
          
Extraordinary Provisions 
(milestones)          
Discl Stmt Milestone 0.25 0 95 0.20 0 64 159 0.472 0.470 
Plan Milestone 0.32 0 95 0.33 0 64 159 0.871 0.871 
Sale Milestone 0.21 0 95 0.09 0 64 159 0.051* 0.052* 
Any Milestone 0.48 0 95 0.44 0 64 159 0.565 0.564 
          
Firm and Case Char          
Assets 1941.13 585 99 3997.70 821 73 172 0.122 0.021** 
Ln(Assets) 6.67 6.37 99 7.12 6.71 73 172 0.015** 0.021** 
Liabilities 1992.32 542 99 3903.06 882 73 172 0.123 0.015** 
Leverage 1.08 0.92 99 1.03 0.97 73 172 0.56 0.405 
Prepack 0.34 0 99 0.37 0 73 172 0.722 0.721 
Sale 0.29 0 99 0.22 0 73 172 0.279 0.278 
 




B. DIP Loan Terms and the Financial Crisis: Ordinary Provisions 
The Financial Crisis’s shock to the credit markets facilitates investigation 
of the relation between changes in credit availability and the terms of DIP 
financing. In this Section and the next, I provide, to my knowledge, the first 
empirical evidence on this relationship. This Section examines two types of 
“ordinary” loan provisions: pricing and reporting covenants. The next Section 
examines two types of “extraordinary” provisions: roll-ups and milestones. 
1. Pricing DIP Loans 
To examine how the pricing of DIP loans varies with financial conditions, 
I take several approaches. First, to understand generally how DIP loans are 
priced, Table 4 below shows the average pricing for all corporate bonds and 
DIP loans issued in each of the sample years.103 I measure pricing as the all-in 
spread above LIBOR (AIS), which captures interest costs, fees, and other 
charges associated with obtaining the loan. The average spread is broken down 
for each category of credit rating, where higher ratings indicate rating agency 
determinations of lower default risk. Of course, this simple analysis does not 
account for firm characteristics, but it gives some context for how DIP loans 
are priced. As the table indicates, interest rates on DIP loans are generally 
similar to those for “Non-investment grade speculative” or “Highly 
speculative” bonds. So DIP loans are priced similarly to junk bonds—albeit 
high-quality junk bonds. 
 
103. In order to compare DIP loan pricing with corporate bonds, the DIP spread in Table 4 
includes LIBOR. The numbers in Table 4 therefore differ from those in Figure 4 below. 
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Table 4: Pricing of DIP Loans versus Corporate Bonds 
 
This table shows the average pricing for all corporate bonds and DIP loans issued in each 
sample year. To be able to compare DIP loan and bond pricing, the DIP loan spread includes 
LIBOR. As the bold figures show, DIP loans are generally priced like speculative junk 
bonds. 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 DIP Loan Spread (inc. LIBOR) 
Median 612.10 703.30 895.00 712.40 908.90 810.40 492.30 483.00 801.30 
Mean 680.95 769.47 969.58 797.40 919.23 850.08 554.80 579.00 709.63 
Obs. 13 15 6 5 15 31 6 5 3 
 Average Spread on Corporate Bonds Issued 
Prime 362.52 451.10 532.42 514.61 368.41 248.74 203.60 175.00 117.27 
High Grade 393.45 438.76 552.78 681.67 341.78 291.15 566.45 177.61 139.13 
Upper Medium Grade 412.68 420.15 423.84 510.12 475.72 525.25 401.61 365.57 311.45 
Lower Medium Grade 481.13 547.09 563.11 558.11 654.05 665.48 501.50 452.60 401.75 
Non-Investment 
Grade Speculative 631.27 651.46 641.64 632.88 740.62 851.53 744.93 645.13 557.01 
Highly Speculative 779.99 804.68 829.67 777.39 865.69 965.68 915.12 869.69 770.54 
Substantial Risks 716.27 886.96 942.38 946.44 954.45 924.38 972.85 970.16 928.04 
Extremely Speculative 883.33 828.72 1125.00 706.25 945.00 1129.69 812.83 850.00 1133.33 
 
 




This high-quality-junk-bond pricing for DIP loans is perhaps surprising 
because DIP loans have much lower historical rates of default than do junk 
bonds. To my knowledge, only two DIP loans have ever experienced a 
payment default.104 By comparison, corporate bonds with similar pricing have 
experienced average annual default rates of 10% or more.105 Of course, default 
risk is only one component of loan pricing. Liquidity risk also affects 
pricing,106 as does the cost of lender monitoring, and both of these factors are 
intuitively more costly for DIP loans than for corporate bonds.107 In addition, as 
earlier noted,108 institutional features may preclude competitive pricing for DIP 
loans, unlike bond markets. 
Next, as shown in Figure 4, I track mean DIP borrowing costs over the 
sample period. AIS over LIBOR is reported on the right axis.109 The graph for 
Available Credit from Figure 1 is superimposed on the left axis. 
 
 
104. See Moody’s Comments on Debtor-In-Possession Lending, MOODY’S 4 (Oct. 2008), 
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/defaultresearch/2007300000539803.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7HC-J7PP] (detailing the DIP loan defaults of Marvel Entertainment Group and 
Winstar Communications). One of those DIP loans was ultimately repaid in full. See id. (noting that 
Marvel Entertainment Group’s DIP loan “was repaid in full, but not per original payment terms of the 
facility.”). 
105. See STANDARD & POOR’S, 2014 ANNUAL GLOBAL CORPORATE DEFAULT STUDY AND 
RATING TRANSITIONS 9 (2014), https://www.nact.org/resources/2014_SP_Global_Corporate_Default_ 
Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8SY-BEBW] (noting default rates frequently above ten percent for CCC 
rated bonds). For example, the mean DIP pricing in 2006 was comparable to mean pricing for CCC+ 
rated bonds. The average default rate for these CCC+ rated bonds was 13.33% in 2006. See id. 
106. Hui Chen et al., Quantifying Liquidity and Default Risks of Corporate Bonds Over the 
Business Cycle, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 852, 853 (2018) (describing the relationship between liquidity and 
pricing); Francis A. Longstaff et al., Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence 
from the Credit Default Swap Market, 60 J. FIN. 2213, 2246 (2005) (noting studies finding “that 
variation in liquidity is a risk that is priced in equity markets”). 
107. DIP loans are quite different from the typical corporate bond insofar as the DIP lender 
will engage in far more monitoring than bondholders do. The dataset shows, for example, that many DIP 
lenders require weekly—or even daily—updates of their borrower’s financial condition. Corporate 
bondholders, on the other hand, generally have little interaction with their borrower companies and do 
not actively monitor them. Indeed, even as compared to ordinary bank loans, corporate bonds contain 
very few financial covenants. Additionally, the DIP lender must not only monitor and understand the 
debtor’s business, but must monitor and understand the impact of Chapter 11 on the debtor’s business. 
See Mark Shapiro, Supplemental Testimony Before the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 
11, at 2 (2012),  http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/30nov2012/M_Shapiro_ABI 
_Supplemental_Testimony_May_20_2013_2.docx [https://perma.cc/A64U-JLWC] (noting lenders must 
“engage in all analyses that are attendant to a more typical loan to a non-distressed commercial 
borrower, but they also must understand the legal and financial framework that encompasses a potential 
borrower in a Chapter 11”). 
108. See supra Section I.A. 
109. AIS in Figure 5 is reported as spread above LIBOR, whereas AIS reported in Table 1 
includes LIBOR. 
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The dashed line in this figure captures mean DIP loan borrowing costs (AIS over LIBOR) 
for each sample year (right axis). The solid line is Available Credit from Figure 1 (left axis). 
 
For most of the sample period, not surprisingly, the costs of DIP 
borrowing look to be moving inversely with Available Credit. As Available 
Credit rises from the beginning of the sample period through mid-2007, DIP 
loan costs correspondingly decrease. Then as Available Credit nosedives from 
mid-2007 through 2009, DIP loan costs rise, peaking in 2009 before falling 
again as Available Credit recovers in 2010.110 Consistent with this inverse 
relationship, the correlation between my liquidity measure and AIS is -0.24 
(statistically significant at 5%). 
To incorporate case-specific characteristics, I use regression analysis. In 
Table 5 below, I provide two models testing the relationship between AIS and 
Available Credit. The first model includes only standard controls—firm and 
case characteristics—which allows me to keep all 99 observations containing 




110. Although DIP loan costs appear to rise along with Available Credit in 2012, that sample 
year includes only 14 DIP cases. The apparent anomaly could be an artifact of the details of specific 
cases. 




Table 5: DIP Loan Pricing and Available Credit 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Ln (AIS) Ln (AIS) 
   
Available Credit (%) -0.147*** -0.121*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0409) 
Prepack -0.0428 -0.0498 
 (0.112) (0.121) 
363 Sale 0.160 0.137 
 (0.117) (0.157) 
Ln(Assets) -0.00511 -0.0162 
 (0.0392) (0.0497) 
Leverage -0.0969 -0.115 
 (0.0847) (0.0847) 
Fin. Covenants  0.00248 
  (0.0327) 
Any Milestone  0.165 
  (0.119) 
Roll-up/DIP Loan  -0.0555 
  (0.177) 
Constant 6.308*** 6.360*** 
 (0.320) (0.427) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 99 90 
R-squared 0.261 0.292 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares tests for the relationship between DIP loan 
pricing—proxied by the natural log of All-in Spread above LIBOR—and Available Credit, 
our main independent variable of interest. The Column (1) test controls for the borrower’s 
size, leverage, and industry, and whether the bankruptcy was prepackaged or a Section 363 
sale. Size is measured as the natural log of total assets, and leverage is measured as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. Both are calculated using the most recently available 
financial statements filed with the SEC before bankruptcy. Column (2) adds controls for 
DIP loan terms—the number of financial covenants, whether any milestone is included, and 
the ratio of Roll-up/DIP Loan. Both models use robust standard errors and control for 
industry fixed effects using 1-digit SIC codes. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% 
are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5 shows a statistically and economically significant inverse 
relationship between Ln(AIS) and changes in credit availability during the 
Crisis. The estimates suggest that, holding all other variables constant, for a 1% 
increase in Available Credit, AIS decreases by an estimated 11-14%.111 It 
makes sense that a positive change in credit supply generally reduces DIP 
borrowing costs and vice versa. Indeed, empirical studies confirm that loan 
contracts outside of bankruptcy include higher pricing and more lender-
protective features when credit becomes more scarce.112 
In sum, the results indicate that the pricing of DIP loans appears 
connected to the ebb and flow of the wider credit markets. Such a finding does 
not necessarily mean that DIP loans are fully efficient and perfectly priced, but 
it does indicate that market forces affect DIP pricing. 
2. Loan Covenants 
Next, I analyze the use of reporting covenants during the Financial Crisis. 
Reporting covenants require the debtor to provide the lender with specific 
information at pre-determined reporting intervals. Such monitoring covenants 
have become increasingly common in the last decade or so. Modern 
information systems facilitate ever more exacting creditor monitoring of debtor 
business activities, such that reporting demands have become both more 
extensive and more frequent. Though imposing a budget on the debtor has 
always been common, DIP lenders now commonly demand monthly or even 
weekly reporting on budget deviations and cash levels. 
Consistent with the findings on loan pricing, I find evidence that reporting 
covenants became more lender-friendly during the Crisis.113 In particular, 
lenders began requiring updates at more frequent intervals. For example, the 
data set shows requirements for daily borrowing base updates only in 2007, 
2008, and 2009;114 in other years, the most frequent update required is weekly. 
Similarly, the first observations of weekly financial statement reporting appear 
during the Crisis; in other years, the most frequent update required is monthly. 
 
111. I exponentiate the coefficients on Available Credit to generate this range. 
112. See Boot et al., supra note 60, at 471 (noting the relationship between higher interest 
rates—and thus credit scarcity—and collateral requirements in loan documents); Choi & Triantis, supra 
note 61, at 61 (“[P]ractitioners attribute changes in the breadth or tightness of covenants and in the 
collateral requirements to swings in the relative bargaining or market power caused by changing supply 
and demand conditions of credit markets.”); Bradley & Roberts, supra note 49, at 21 (finding that 
scarcity in credit markets leads to higher number of covenants in loan agreements). 
113. Reporting covenants are very common in DIP loans, so there is relatively slight yearly 
variation in the use of such covenants. It is for this reason that I focus on the characteristics (rather than 
the presence) of reporting covenants. 
114. A borrowing base most typically includes inventory and accounts receivable as the 
collateral against which the lender lends. Because the levels and value of inventory and accounts 
receivable in a going concern are always changing, and the lender does not want to extend more credit 
than its collateral is worth, borrowing base reports are a common feature of inventory-accounts 
receivable financing. 




Indeed, when we consider the percentage of total available covenants that are at 
the most stringent level,115 the percentage increases from roughly 8% (2004-
2006) to 15% (2007-2009) and then decreases to 10% (2010-2012).116 This 
finding is consistent with the literature on covenants outside of bankruptcy, 
which has found that covenants become more prevalent and more restrictive as 
the rate of interest increases.117 
This trend is displayed in Figures 5 and 6 below. The columns (left-hand 
scale) show by year the number of DIP loans requiring budget and cash 
reporting, the most common covenants in the sample, as well as the range of 
their different frequencies. The most common reporting intervals are weekly 
and monthly, with weekly being the most stringent. The lower solid portion of 
each column represents the number of weekly reporting covenants by year, 
while the middle striped portion represents monthly reporting, and the top solid 
portion represents all other reporting intervals. For both sets of covenants, 
weekly reporting dominates in 2009, at the height of the Financial Crisis, while 
monthly reporting is generally more common in 2007 and before. Following 
the solid line (right-hand scale) in each figure, we also see a spike in the 
percentage of weekly budget and cash reporting around 2009, and generally 
less frequent resort to weekly reporting before and after. This pattern roughly 
tracks Available Credit. 
 
 
115. This analysis includes only reporting covenants relating to financial statements, budgets, 
borrowing base, and cash—not asset sales. Covenants related to asset sales are omitted because it is 
difficult to determine the “strictest” level. The ratio reflects the number of covenants at the strictest level 
relative to the total number of DIP loans in the year multiplied by four (i.e., the total number of these 
four covenants that could theoretically exist in all DIP loans in that year). 
116. Even though I find that the frequency of reporting is sensitive to changes in credit 
availability, the data also suggest the use of reporting covenants may have increased during the Crisis 
and remained sticky thereafter. 
117. Billett et al., supra note 59; Nini et al., supra note 49; Bradley & Roberts, supra note 49. 
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This figure captures the incidence of budget-reporting covenants and their required reporting 
frequencies by year. The two most common frequencies are weekly and monthly. Columns 
(left-hand scale) represent the number of budget-reporting covenants by year. Counts of 
weekly budget reporting are represented by the lower solid portion of each column; counts 
of monthly budget reporting are represented in the middle striped portion of each column; 
all other reporting intervals are represented by the solid upper portion of each column. The 
solid line (right-hand scale) represents by year the percentage of budget-reporting covenants 
that require weekly reporting, the most stringent reporting interval. 
 





This figure captures the incidence of cash-reporting covenants and their required reporting 
frequencies by year. The two most common frequencies are weekly and monthly. Columns 
(left-hand scale) represent the number of cash-reporting covenants by year. Counts of 
weekly cash reporting are represented by the lower solid portion of each column; counts of 
monthly cash reporting are represented in the middle striped portion of each column; all 
other reporting intervals are represented by the solid upper portion of each column. The 
solid line (right-hand scale) represents by year the percentage of cash-reporting covenants 
that require weekly reporting, the most stringent reporting interval. 
 
To analyze this pattern in more detail, Table 6 presents a regression 
analysis of the relationship between cash reporting frequency and Available 
Credit. The cash reporting covenant is coded according to its reporting interval 
in days (e.g., a weekly reporting requirement is coded as 7 and a biweekly 
requirement as 14), and each value enters the regression in log form.118 As in 
Table 5, Column 1 controls for firm and case characteristics, and Column 2 




118. I take the natural log of the dependent variable to address concerns that the results might 
be driven by outliers. Although most covenants require reporting at intervals that range from 7 to 30 
days, a few DIP loans include covenants that require only annual reporting. Without taking the log value 
of the dependent variable, these extreme observations could skew the results. I also note that, in some 
cases, it is difficult to convert the descriptive data into numeric values that can be input into a 
regression. For example, it is unclear how one would code a reporting covenant that requires reporting 
“upon request” or “as needed.” In these cases, I drop the observation. 
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Available Credit (%) 0.105** 0.0833 
 (0.0521) (0.0570) 
Prepack 0.0877 0.102 
 (0.184) (0.194) 
363 Sale -0.00112 0.0842 
 (0.181) (0.211) 
Ln (Assets) 0.0318 0.0730 
 (0.0869) (0.102) 
Leverage -0.0483 0.132 
 (0.112) (0.173) 
Fin. Covenants  -0.0387 
  (0.0798) 
Any Milestone  -0.122 
  (0.162) 
Roll-Up/DIP Loan  0.253 
  (0.273) 
Constant 2.428*** 1.985** 
 (0.658) (0.799) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 155 145 
R-squared 0.090 0.124 
 
This table presents log-linear regressions testing for associations between the stringency of 
cash reporting covenants and Available Credit. The dependent variable is the natural log of 
the reporting interval for the cash-reporting covenant, measured in days. Column (1) 
controls for case and firm characteristics—whether the case involves a prepackaged 
bankruptcy or a Section 363 sale, firm size as measured by the natural log of total assets, 
and leverage as measured by total assets divided by total liabilities. As before, assets and 
liabilities are drawn from the most recently available financial statements filed with the SEC 
before bankruptcy. Column (2) adds controls for DIP loan terms—the number of financial 
covenants, whether any milestone is included, and the ratio of Roll-up/DIP Loan. Both 
models use robust standard errors and control for industry fixed effects using 1-digit SIC 
codes. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% are represented using ***, **, and *, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
As predicted, Table 6 shows that the frequency of cash reporting has a 
positive relationship with changes in credit availability, though the Column 2 




coefficient on Available Credit is not statistically significant. Cash reporting 
requirements are less demanding—reporting intervals are longer—with 
positive changes in credit availability. The Column 1 estimates suggest that, 
holding all other variables constant, a 1% increase in Available Credit is 
associated with an 11% increase in the cash reporting interval. This finding, 
consistent with the earlier finding on DIP loan pricing, provides further 
evidence that ordinary loan provisions are related to economic conditions. 
C. DIP Loan Terms and the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary Provisions 
Here, I study Judge Gerber’s articulated hope in Lyondell that 
extraordinary provisions in DIP loan arrangements, such as roll-ups and 
milestones, would become less common as credit markets recovered after the 
Financial Crisis. 
1. Incidence of Roll-Ups 
My investigation of roll-ups and Available Credit proceeds in two parts. I 
first focus on roll-ups generally, taking account of all roll-ups in DIP loans. I 
then investigate roll-ups from a slightly different perspective. This second 
approach ignores roll-ups of pre-bankruptcy working-capital loans, and instead 
focuses only on roll-ups of pre-bankruptcy term loans and other non-working-
capital loans.119 It has been suggested that for reasons of practicality and 
convenience, courts and practitioners may implicitly view roll-ups of pre-
bankruptcy working-capital loans as less objectionable than roll-ups of other 
types of pre-bankruptcy debt (e.g., term loans).120 Given this possibility, it 
 
119. With a term loan, the borrower borrows a set amount at the inception of the loan and 
typically makes periodic interest payments on that outstanding amount until it repays or refinances the 
total amount borrowed. With a working-capital loan, by contrast, the borrower enjoys the flexibility to 
borrow and repay repeatedly as needed, such that the amount owed fluctuates over time. The working-
capital loan is typically collateralized with the borrower’s accounts receivable and/or inventory (i.e., the 
“working” capital), and the total debt outstanding at any given time is constrained based on the value of 
the collateral. For convenience, I refer to non-working-capital loans collectively as “term loans.” 
120. Because working-capital lines typically rely on accounts receivable and/or inventory for 
collateral, it may make sense to allow this pre-bankruptcy collateral to turn over as part of the debtor’s 
ordinary course postpetition operations, with the proceeds of this prepetition collateral paying off the 
pre-bankruptcy working-capital debt. Otherwise, the pre-bankruptcy working capital collateral would 
have to be segregated from postpetition working capital for the duration of the case. This approach 
would create recordkeeping headaches for the debtor; it also precludes the pre-bankruptcy working 
capital from actually “working.” By contrast, using the DIP loan to refinance the pre-bankruptcy 
working-capital line from the start relieves the debtor from having to distinguish prepetition from 
postpetition collateral or proceeds. Thanks to Douglas Baird and Rich Levin for pointing me to this 
issue. Of course, this administrative convenience does not diminish the potential harm to junior creditors 
from roll-ups generally. For example, as earlier noted, a creditor whose pre-bankruptcy claim is rolled 
up has effectively eliminated its reorganization risk. See supra note 80. And a secured creditor that is 
undersecured at the time of the filing could still advantage itself with a working capital roll-up to render 
the creditor fully secured before the end of the case. See supra Section II.A. 
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makes sense to investigate term loan roll-ups separately from roll-ups that 
include pre-bankruptcy working capital loans. 
To start, we consider all roll-ups. Figure 7 differentiates the DIP loans in 
my sample based on whether the loan includes a roll-up. The height of each bar 
represents the number of DIP loan cases in a given year (left axis). The lower 
dark region of each bar captures the number of cases with roll-ups; the upper 
lighter region of each bar captures the number of cases without roll-ups. The 
curve above shows the percentage of DIP cases in each year that included a 
roll-up (right axis). Overall, 99 of the DIP cases (58%) have a roll-up. 
 
 
This figure shows the use of roll-ups by year. The height of each column represents the 
number of DIP loans in a given year (left-hand scale). The lower dark part of each column 
shows the number of DIP loans that include a roll-up, while the upper lighter region of each 
bar captures the number of DIP loan cases without a roll-up. The curved line (right-hand 
scale) shows the percentage of DIP loans that include a roll-up. 
 
Based on the descriptive evidence in Figure 7, there does not seem to be a 
significant relationship between roll-ups and Available Credit. Although the 
volume of DIP loans and roll-ups increased during the Crisis, there is no 
obvious change in the percentage of DIP loans that include roll-ups. The 
percentage of roll-ups is at its lowest in 2009, the pivotal Crisis year, and the 
percentage climbs post-Crisis. This is puzzling. Because judges often cite 
tightened credit availability when approving roll-ups, we would expect a 
negative relation between the incidence of roll-ups and Available Credit. 
For more formal tests, I rely on two sets of roll-up measures as dependent 
variables, presented in Table 7 below. The first set applies to roll-ups generally. 
It includes a dummy variable indicating whether or not a DIP loan includes a 
roll-up, and two measures that capture the size of roll-ups: (a) the log of the 
raw dollar amount of the roll-up; and (b) the log odds ratio of the roll-up 




amount scaled by the total amount of the DIP loan. The proportion of the DIP 
loan constituting roll-ups is a factor that bankruptcy judges care about when 
deciding whether or not to approve a DIP loan. The ABI posits that a DIP loan 
with a roll-up feature should be approved only when the DIP loan “extends 
substantial new credit to the debtor, and provides more financing on better 
terms than alternative facilities offered to the debtor.”121 The second set of roll-
up measures applies to term-loan roll-ups and is analogous to the first. This 
second set includes a dummy variable for the presence of a term roll-up, a 
proxy for the log of the raw dollar amount of a term roll-up, and a variable, 
Log-Odds(Term Roll-up/Lean DIP). This latter variable captures the log-odds 
ratio of the term roll-up amount, scaled by what I refer to as the “Lean DIP,” 
which is the amount of the DIP loan, minus the amount of any working capital 
roll-up. I subtract any working capital roll-up amount from the DIP loan 
amount so that in this analysis, we are scaling the term roll-up only by the new 
DIP money plus the term roll-up.122 
 
 
121. ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 73. I use the log-odds transformation to render the data 
suitable for OLS regression. 
122. This variable Log-Odds(Term Rollup/Lean DIP) (a) scales the term roll-up amount by 
the amount of new money from the DIP loan plus the term roll-up, and then (b) takes the log odds. 
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Table 7: Measures of Roll-Ups 
 





Roll-Up Dummy 0.58 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Ln(Roll-Up)  4.43 4.38 3.63 5.24 
Log-Odds(Roll-Up/DIP Loan) .42 .42 -.11 1.00 
     
Term Roll-Ups     
Term Roll-Up Dummy 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ln(Term Roll-Up)  4.17 4.21 3.02 4.97 
Log-Odds(Term Roll-Up/ 
Lean DIP) 0.03 0.14 -0.38 0.44 
 
This table describes the various roll-up measures I use as the dependent variable to test for 
an association between roll-ups and Available Credit. To investigate roll-ups generally, I use 
Roll-Up Dummy in a logit model to test for the hypothesized negative association between 
extraordinary provisions and Available Credit. I also test for roll-up amounts, conditional on 
the amount being greater than zero. I use Ln(Roll-Up), the natural log of the Roll-Up 
amount, and Log-Odds(Roll-up/DIP Loan), the log odds ratio of Roll-Up/DIP Loan, as 
dependent variables in ordinary least squares regressions. To test term roll-ups, I use 
analogous dependent variables. Log-Odds(Term Roll-Up/Lean DIP) is the log odds ratio of 
Term Roll-Up, scaled by Lean DIP. Lean DIP is DIP Loan minus the amount of any 
working-capital roll-up. I subtract working-capital roll-ups so that in the log-odds analysis, 
we are scaling the term roll-up only by (new money + Term Roll-Up). 
 
In Table 8 below, I run a series of tests using the three proxies for all roll-
ups. These models control for the same variables as the DIP loan pricing 
regression in Table 5, Column 2, except that here I include separate controls for 
the three types of milestones (disclosure statement, plan, and sale milestones), 
plus an additional control for the DIP loan amount. As before, robust standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. Column 1 is a logit model: the dependent 
variable is an indicator that tests whether the presence of a roll-up is negatively 
associated with Available Credit, as we would expect given courts’ 
pronouncements justifying resort to roll-ups when credit is scarce. The 
coefficient on Available Credit turns out to be positive and insignificant, 
however. It fails to confirm a negative relationship between Available Credit 
and the presence of roll-ups. 
 




Table 8: All Roll-Ups and Available Credit: Regression 






    
Available Credit (%) 0.0484 0.136** 0.174* 
 (0.130) (0.0629) (0.0884) 
Prepack 0.120 -0.374 -0.439 
 (0.448) (0.276) (0.304) 
363 Sale 0.0138 -0.0418 -0.0374 
 (0.539) (0.232) (0.292) 
Ln(Assets) -0.636** 0.700*** -0.366** 
 (0.278) (0.129) (0.148) 
Leverage 0.0872 -3.460*** -0.704 
 (0.281) (1.258) (1.872) 
DIP Loan 0.00195* 0.000234** 0.000170** 
 (0.00107) (0.000105) (8.47e-05) 
Fin. Covenants 0.150 0.101 -0.0246 
 (0.166) (0.0698) (0.0777) 
Disc. St. Milestone 0.574 -0.485** -0.148 
 (0.654) (0.236) (0.435) 
Plan Milestone -0.500 0.637*** 0.390 
 (0.565) (0.231) (0.395) 
Sale Milestone 1.416** 0.0726 0.144 
 (0.675) (0.235) (0.263) 
Constant 4.038** 2.881* 3.524 
 (1.986) (1.605) (2.393) 
    
Regression Logit OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 157 88 88 
R-Squared  0.681 0.265 
Pseudo R2 0.197   
 
This table presents tests using three proxies for roll-ups as the dependent variable, with Available 
Credit as our main variable of interest. Column (1) shows a logit model with Roll-Up Dummy as an 
indicator variable for the presence of a roll-up. Columns (2) and (3) present OLS regressions using 
transformed roll-up data. The dependent variable in Column (2) is Ln(Roll-Up), the natural log of the 
roll-up amount, while the dependent variable in Column (3) is the log of the ratio of Roll-Up/DIP loan. 
The models control for the same variables as the DIP Loan pricing regression in Table 5, Column (2), 
except that I include separate controls for the three types of milestones (disclosure statement, plan, and 
sale milestones, plus an additional control for the DIP loan amount (DIP Loan). All models use robust 
standard errors and control for industry fixed effects using 1-digit SIC codes. Statistical significance of 
1%, 5%, and 10% are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
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Columns 2 and 3 offer more granular tests using OLS regressions. These 
models test for an inverse relation between roll-up amounts and Available 
Credit, conditional on the roll-up amount being greater than zero. In Column 2, 
we find that the coefficient on Available Credit is statistically significant, but in 
the opposite direction from what we would expect: this test shows a positive 
association between Available Credit and roll-up size. Finally, in Column 3 our 
dependent variable is the log odds ratio of (Roll-Up/DIP Loan). This measure 
captures judges’ preference that the roll-up amount not be too large relative to 
the new credit extended by the DIP loan.123 The coefficient on our dependent 
variable is again positive and significant. The economic effect of these results 
is also notable. The Column 2 estimate suggests that holding all other variables 
constant, a 1% increase in Available Credit is associated with a 14.6% increase 
in roll-up size. The tests in Table 8 show no evidence of a negative relationship 
between Available Credit and roll-ups. Far from it. These tests suggest instead 
that roll-up size increases with Available Credit. 
I run a similar analysis in Table 9 below, focusing only on term roll-ups. 
In Column 1, the logit model tests whether the presence of a term roll-up is 
associated with Available Credit. We again observe a statistically significant 
coefficient on the dependent dummy variable in the opposite direction of what 
we would expect. Here the coefficient on Available Credit suggests a positive 
association between the incidence of term roll-ups and Available Credit. 
Testing for the size of term roll-ups in Columns 2 and 3 using OLS regressions, 
we see negative but statistically insignificant coefficients on Available Credit, 
as well as very large standard errors that preclude us from drawing any 
conclusions from these tests. 
 
 
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 




Table 9: Term Roll-Ups and Available Credit: Regression 
 










    
Available Credit (%) 0.337** -0.0855 -0.00425 
 (0.167) (0.117) (0.186) 
Prepack 0.432 -0.371 -0.411 
 (0.600) (0.466) (0.621) 
363 Sale 0.0540 -0.798* -0.637* 
 (0.688) (0.421) (0.360) 
Ln(Assets) -0.249 0.694*** -0.154 
 (0.283) (0.217) (0.266) 
Leverage -0.609 -4.549** 0.818 
 (1.041) (2.040) (2.205) 
DIP Loan Amount 0.00108 0.000201* 3.48e-05 
 (0.000764) (0.000109) (0.000139) 
Fin. Covenants 0.195 0.0662 -0.00517 
 (0.165) (0.132) (0.153) 
Disc. St. Milestone 0.250 -0.583 0.242 
 (0.753) (0.419) (0.628) 
Plan Milestone -0.0905 -0.148 -0.629 
 (0.622) (0.446) (0.639) 
Sale Milestone 0.0297 -0.00992 0.295 
 (0.685) (0.485) (0.579) 
Constant 0.325 4.626 0.475 
 (2.279) (2.709) (3.125) 
    
Regression Logit OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 156 37 37 
R-Squared  0.859 0.291 
Pseudo R2 0.116   
 
This table presents tests using three proxies for term roll-ups as the dependent variable, with Available Credit as 
our main variable of interest. Column (1) shows a logit regression with Term Roll-Up Dummy as an indicator 
variable for the presence of a roll-up. Columns (2) and (3) present OLS regressions using transformed roll-up data. 
The dependent variable in Column (2) is Ln(Term Roll-Up), the natural log of the term roll-up amount, while the 
dependent variable in Column (3) is the log of the ratio of Term Roll-Up/Lean DIP. The models control for the 
same variables as the DIP Loan pricing regression in Table 5, Column (2), except that I include separate controls 
for the three types of milestones (disclosure statement, plan, and sale milestones, plus an additional control for the 
DIP loan amount (DIP Loan). All models use robust standard errors and control for industry fixed effects using 1-
digit SIC codes. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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I perform a number of robustness checks for the roll-up analyses. In 
unreported tests, in addition to using multiple proxies for changes in credit 
availability,124 I use a slew of additional roll-up measures and control variables, 
as well as year and court fixed effects.125 I also check for outliers and run tests 
dropping successive years from the sample in case a particular year may have 
outsized influence on the results.126 The results remain qualitatively similar. In 
no event do I find evidence of a statistically significant inverse relationship 
between Available Credit and any roll-up measure, and as earlier noted, I do 
find statistically significant evidence of a positive relationship. 
2. Incidence of Milestones 
Roll-ups are of course only one type of extraordinary provision. 
Milestones also play an important role in DIP lending, and I examine their 
usage below. As with my prediction on the use of roll-ups, I expect the use of 
milestones to decrease as credit markets improve. Overall, 34% of the DIP 
cases include a reorganization milestone. Recall that reorganization milestones 
are covenants that place deadlines on specific important events associated with 
the reorganization process, typically the filing or court approval of the 
disclosure statement or plan of reorganization. Far fewer of the DIP cases—
only 16%—include a sale milestone. Sale milestones are typically used when, 
instead of attempting an internal reorganization, the DIP lender and the debtor 
agree that the debtor will sell the business. 
Descriptive statistics do not show an obvious relationship between 
Available Credit and the use of milestones. In Figure 8 below, the lower dark 
region of each bar captures the number of cases with at least one milestone; the 
upper lighter region of each bar captures the number of cases without 
milestones. The curve above shows the percentage of DIP cases in each year 
that include at least one milestone (right axis).  As discussed before, the Crisis 
began in late 2007 and lasted until mid-2009.127 Yet the years 2007 and 2011 
had the greatest incidence of milestones, defined as the percentage of DIP loans 
including a milestone. 
 
124. See supra note 99 (describing alternative proxies for changes in credit availability). 
125. For court fixed effects, I run tests distinguishing the bankruptcy courts in Delaware and 
the Southern District of New York from other courts and from each other. Tests without industry fixed 
effects also generate results qualitatively similar to our main results. 
126. Recall that over 30% of the sample cases were filed in 2009. See supra Section III.A.3. 
127. See supra note 100. 





This figure shows the use of milestones by year. The height of each column represents the 
number of DIP loans in a given year for which milestone data are available (left-hand scale). 
The lower dark part of each column shows the number of DIP loans that include at least one 
milestone, while the upper lighter region of each bar captures the number of DIP loan cases 
without a milestone. The curved line (right-hand scale) shows by year the percentage of DIP 
loans that include a milestone. 
 
Although I conduct more detailed empirical analysis on the relationship 
between these milestones and Available Credit, I am unable to identify a 
significant relationship. Table 10 reflects the correlations among use of 
milestones and changes in credit availability. None of the correlations between 
Availability Credit and any milestone are statistically significant, indicating the 
lack of a strong relationship between these variables in the sample. 
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Available Credit (%) 1     
 
     
Discl Stmt Milestone -0.05 1    
 (p<.50)     
Plan Milestone -0.07 0.70*** 1   
 (p<.36) (p<.00)    
Sale Milestone 0.09 -0.04 -0.09 1  
 (p<.28) (p<.59) (p<.27)   
Any Milestone -0.01 0.59*** 0.74*** 0.47*** 1 
 (p<0.87) (p<.00) (p<.00) (p<.00)  
 
This table shows tests for correlations between Available Credit and the use milestones. The 
left-hand column shows the results of interest. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% 
are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
In unreported tests, I also run probit regressions testing the relationship 
between milestones and Available Credit. All controls and other specifications 
are the same as those used previously. Across all models, I find no evidence of 
a significant relation between Available Credit and use of milestones, so I omit 
these results for concision. 
IV. Implications and Conclusion 
DIP financing is crucial for many debtors, but lenders may understandably 
be hesitant to lend to firms in severe financial distress. Recognizing this 
dilemma, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes debtors to offer sweeteners to DIP 
lenders. But some of these sweeteners—here, roll-ups and milestones—are 
controversial because they are thought to come at the expense of the firm’s 
other stakeholders, and roll-ups are inconsistent with the Code’s distribution 
scheme. Nonetheless, the volume of these inducements escalated during recent 
years, leading to growing debate over whether DIP lenders were abusing their 
power—or whether the terms of DIP loans simply reflected a tighter credit 
environment. 
In this Article, I use a hand-collected dataset to provide the first empirical 
analysis on the relationship between economic conditions and the terms of DIP 
loans. As one might expect, the evidence shows that ordinary loan provisions 
like pricing and covenants are sensitive to economic conditions. But I also find 




that the kinds of extraordinary loan provisions often justified as necessary to 
induce DIP lending—roll-ups and milestones—have no statistically meaningful 
relationship with changes in credit availability.128 With no demonstrable 
association between changes in credit market conditions and the incidence of 
roll-ups—and to a lesser extent, milestones—the case for their continuing use 
seems weak. 
As noted above, a roll-up has significant effects for both the structuring of 
plan negotiations and the costs of DIP financing. In addition to being inimical 
to the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution scheme, roll-up significantly augments 
the DIP lender’s influence over the case.129 This augmented DIP lender 
influence correspondingly diminishes the negotiating leverage of the debtor 
and competing creditors, a result that the drafters of the Code could not 
plausibly have contemplated, since only through roll-ups are these multiple 
disempowering effects on the debtor and competing creditors realized. The 
distortive effects of roll-ups on plan negotiation make cross-collateralization 
seem mild. DIP lenders might understandably feel entitled to outsized influence 
over the course of a case when credit is scarce. Scarcity may command a 
premium. But without evidence that the incidence or size of roll-ups respond to 
Available Credit, resort to roll-ups—and the accompanying control that DIP 
lenders enjoy—seem hard to justify as a general matter. Offering DIP financing 
should not ordinarily entitle the DIP lender to cash out its pre-bankruptcy claim 
at the beginning of the case, instead of having to negotiate the claim’s 
treatment as do all other pre-bankruptcy creditors. 
Besides increased control for the DIP lender, roll-ups increase the debtor’s 
financing costs, sometimes dramatically,130 by increasing the size of the DIP 
loan by the amount of the roll-up. Moreover, because the roll-up is not new 
credit, it contributes nothing to the reorganization effort. Instead, it detracts 
from the endeavor. Between the high interest accrued on the roll-up over the 
course of the case and the cash required to repay the roll-up at confirmation, 
roll-ups turn out to be quite an expensive proposition, which redounds to the 
detriment of junior claimants. Roll-ups also obfuscate DIP loan costs. Curbing 
or eliminating reliance on roll-ups would facilitate more transparent pricing of 
DIP loans across cases. Far better to see new money DIP loan costs 
transparently in the all-in spread, without the befogging effect of roll-up. 
Courts and debtors might more easily compare DIP loan pricing across cases 
when DIP loans do not harbor rolled up debt. 
What about milestones? Though milestones may tend to intrude on 
judges’ discretion to manage case timetables, milestones may be less distortive 
 
128. As earlier noted, the statistically significant associations between Available Credit and 
roll-up measures found in my tests show only positive relations between those variables. See supra 
Section III.C.1. 
129. See supra Section II.A.2. 
130. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
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than roll-ups. DIP lenders may set unrealistic deadlines, but at the same time, a 
DIP lender would be unlikely to call the DIP loan if the firm is worth saving, 
especially a DIP lender with an outstanding prepetition claim. In a word, 
milestones seem relatively easy to renegotiate. By the time a milestone looms 
large, the parties will have much better information about the firm’s prospects 
than at the case’s inception. The parties’ various positions and interests will 
also be well understood. Reasonable milestones may even hasten the 
reorganization constructively. The judge’s experience can be brought to bear 
when approving milestone provisions. 
By providing much-needed empirical analysis, I hope to help 
policymakers, judges, and other bankruptcy participants better evaluate the DIP 
lending process in order to optimize DIP loan structure going forward. I 
hesitate to draw too strong empirical conclusions from these data, given the 
limited sample size and relatively slight yearly variations.131 At the same time, 
my tests do identify significant relationships between both ordinary and 
extraordinary provisions and Available Credit, so the data do have power. As 
early noted, it may be difficult for individual judges to police extraordinary 
provisions one case at a time. The debtor’s survival will in many cases be truly 
on the line, such that DIP financing may be crucial. And the inside lender’s 
dominant advantage in placing the DIP loan gives it enormous leverage. At the 
same time, however, my results suggest that judges should be skeptical of 
claims that shrinking credit markets might justify resort to roll-ups. 
 
131. Moreover, bankruptcy cases are notoriously complicated; there could be relevant 
unobservable characteristics that I am unable to control for in the models. 





DIP Loan: Effect of a Roll-Up 
 
Figure A1 below illustrates. At the time of filing, the company needs, say, 
$100 million in cash. The lender already has $50 million outstanding on its 
weak (potentially undersecured) pre-bankruptcy loan, so the lender agrees to a 
fresh loan of $150 million, advantaged by the super-priority sections of the 
Code for DIP loans. The DIP loan agreement requires that the debtor will 
immediately draw $50 million of the DIP loan to pay off the weak $50 million 
pre-bankruptcy loan. By extinguishing the pre-bankruptcy loan in this way, the 
payoff “rolls up” the $50 million amount into the highly prioritized DIP loan, 
effectively converting the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy loan into a fully secured 
postpetition claim that gets cashed out at plan confirmation. 
 
Figure A1 
 
